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 At present, many countries (including Iran) face "extremely high" levels of water 
stress, which means more than 80 percent of the water available to agricultural, domes c, 
and industrial users is withdrawn from groundwater resources annually. Based on the 
sta s cs, the agriculture sector is responsible for consuming more than 90 percent of water 
in Iran. To date, the growing demand for water in the agriculture sector has largely been met 
by mining fossil groundwater resources. Indeed, about 90 percent of groundwater use 
belongs to the agriculture sector. Needless to say, this unsustainable trend cannot continue 
for a long time since groundwater resources are limited in practice. So, decision‐makers need 
doing some urgent, effective actions to handle this problem. The main objective of this study 
is understanding the underlying cause of the problem and evaluating usually suggested 
policies to address the crisis. The SD methodology is used. the model is based on “tragedy of 
the commons” theory and tries to explain how farms attempt to maximize their profits turns 
to a serious threat for the sustainability of groundwater resources. In the following, the model 
has been used to evaluate various strategies for avoiding the depletion of groundwater 
resources. For this purpose, “gap analysis” has been used. In gap analysis, the future under 
the present strategy is forecasted. Then, objectives or desired future is identified and the gap 
between the objectives and the future conditions under the current strategy is determined. 
Finally, new strategies which will help to close the gap will be designed. In the end, it is 
concluded that; (1) the government should consider the concept of maximum sustainable 
yield (MSY) and control the size of irrigated land, share of high‐water demand crops, and 
number of wells (2) improving irriga on efficiency and many other policies are fruitless if the 
government do not consider the rebound effect and combined policies should be adopted (3) 
even by changing the water governance to eliminate the tragedy of the commons, overshoot 
and collapse can happen due to misperception  
Key Words: Water Management, Groundwater Resources, Sustainability, Tragedy of the 
Commons, System Dynamics, Iran, Strategy Planning, Sustainable Water Resources Solutions, Water 
Resilience, Unsustainable Management Strategies, Systems Thinking, Integrated Water Resources 
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Tragedy of the Commons in Groundwater Resources 
4 
 




Table of Contents ...............................................................................................................................4 
List of Figures .....................................................................................................................................6 
List of Tables ......................................................................................................................................8 
PART I: Introduction .......................................................................................................................9 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................9 
1.1. A glance at water consumption in Iran.......................................................................... 10 
1.2. A glance at the agricultural sector in Iran ...................................................................... 10 
2. Research Objectives and Research Questions....................................................................... 12 
3. Methodology ........................................................................................................................ 12 
4. Literature Review ................................................................................................................. 13 
4.1. Classification of water studies based on Underlying Model Structure .......................... 14 
5. Data Collection ..................................................................................................................... 19 
PART II: Conceptual Model ........................................................................................................... 20 
6. Background: Tragedy of the Commons ................................................................................. 20 
7. Problem Definition ............................................................................................................... 21 
8. Dynamic Hypothesis ............................................................................................................. 22 
9. Model Boundaries & Assumptions ....................................................................................... 28 
9.1. Model Boundaries: ........................................................................................................ 28 
9.2. Basic Assumptions ........................................................................................................ 28 
PART III: Simulation Model ........................................................................................................... 33 
10. Running Model & Selected Model Formulatios................................................................. 33 
11. Model Credibility .............................................................................................................. 33 
11.1. Boundary Adequacy: ................................................................................................. 34 
11.2. Structure and Parameter Confirmation: .................................................................... 35 
11.3. Dimensional Consistency:.......................................................................................... 35 
11.4. Integration Error: ...................................................................................................... 35 
11.5. Extreme Conditions: .................................................................................................. 35 
Tragedy of the Commons in Groundwater Resources 
5 
 
11.6. Behavior Sensitivity: .................................................................................................. 36 
11.7. Behavior Reproduction: ............................................................................................ 38 
12. Policy Analysis .................................................................................................................. 39 
12.1. Business-as-Usual (B.a.U.) Scenario .......................................................................... 40 
12.1.1. Business-as-Usual Scenario (I) - CC is fixed: ....................................................................... 40 
12.1.2. Business-as-Usual Scenario (II) - Water Table Capacity is eroded ..................................... 42 
12.2. Policies to Manage Groundwater Crisis ..................................................................... 42 
12.3. Evaluation of the Suggested Policies ......................................................................... 44 
12.3.1. Policy (1): Shrinking Agriculture Size ................................................................................. 44 
12.3.2. Policy (2): External limita ons .......................................................................................... 48 
12.3.3. Policy (3): Price of Crop ..................................................................................................... 49 
12.3.4. Policy (4): Yield per ha ...................................................................................................... 50 
12.3.5. Policy (5): Crop Water Requirements per ha ..................................................................... 51 
12.3.6. Policy (6): Permission for digging Wells ............................................................................ 53 
12.3.7. Policy (7): increasing the share of surface water for agriculture sector ............................ 54 
12.3.8. Policy (8): Treated Waste Water for Agriculture ............................................................... 57 
12.3.9. Policy (9): Water Price ....................................................................................................... 57 
12.3.10. Policy (10): Electricity Price ........................................................................................... 59 
12.3.11. Policy (11): EC (electricity consump on) per liter water ............................................... 62 
12.3.12. Policy (12): Opera ng cost ............................................................................................ 63 
12.3.13. Policy (13): Irriga on Efficiency ..................................................................................... 64 
12.3.14. Policy (14): Combined Policies ...................................................................................... 66 
12.3.15. Policy (15): Water Governance (changing the current structure) .................................. 68 
PART IV: Conclusion & Discussion ................................................................................................ 72 
13. Summary:.......................................................................................................................... 72 
14. Suggestion For Future Studies ........................................................................................... 76 
References.................................................................................................................................... 78 
Appendices ................................................................................................................................... 84 
Apendix (A): Literature Review .................................................................................................... 85 
Studies focused on cased of Iran .............................................................................................. 88 
Appendix (B): Simulation model ................................................................................................... 90 
Tragedy of the Commons in Groundwater Resources 
6 
 
Appendix (C): Documentation of simulation model ..................................................................... 91 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Agricultural Land (1987-2013)[8] ........................................................................................ 11 
Figure 2:  Agricultyral produc on (1978-2013) [8] ............................................................................. 11 
Figure 3: Crops Share of Land (2011) [8] ............................................................................................ 11 
Figure 4: Crops Share of Yield [8] ...................................................................................................... 11 
Figure 5: Water Cycle [15] ................................................................................................................. 14 
Figure 6:  Gohari, et al. model for the water crisis [16] ...................................................................... 15 
Figure 7: water-food-energy nexus [20] ............................................................................................ 16 
Figure 8: hydro-economic model[23] ................................................................................................ 17 
Figure 9: Tragedy of the commons in Asian agriculture-Khalid Saeed (1991)[24] ............................... 18 
Figure 10: Tragedy of Commons in Groundwater Resources- Ali Saysel (2018)[25] ............................ 18 
Figure 11: Groundwater Deple on [35] ............................................................................................. 21 
Figure 12: number of wells [35]......................................................................................................... 22 
Figure 13: Dynamic Hypothesis-Part (1) ............................................................................................ 23 
Figure 14: Dynamic Hypothesis-Part (2) ............................................................................................ 26 
Figure 15: Dynamic Hypothesis-Part (3) ............................................................................................ 27 
Figure 16:  Agricultural Land (1987-2013) [8] .................................................................................... 29 
Figure 17: Agricultural Produc on (1987-2013) [8] ............................................................................ 29 
Figure 18: trend of popula on and net agriculture trade[7] .............................................................. 32 
Figure 19: the result of the sensitivity test on water price ................................................................. 36 
Figure 20: result of sensi vity test on “max possible growth based on external limita ons”.............. 37 
Figure 21: result of sensi vity test on “eff of water level water table capacity (WTC)” ...................... 37 
Figure 22: behavior reproduc on test ............................................................................................... 38 
Figure 23: business-as-usual scenario-CC is fixed ............................................................................... 41 
Figure 24: phase plot for the number of wells ................................................................................... 41 
Figure 25: business-as-usual scenario-water capacity is eroded ........................................................ 42 
Figure 26: effect of irrigated land on groundwater resource sustainability ........................................ 44 
Figure 27: Iran's Popula on [45] ....................................................................................................... 46 
Tragedy of the Commons in Groundwater Resources 
7 
 
Figure 28 Iran Popula on Pyramid [45] ............................................................................................. 46 
Figure 29: effect of max possible growth based on external limitations on groundwater resource 
sustainability..................................................................................................................................... 48 
Figure 30: effect of max possible growth based on external limita ons on groundwater resource 
sustainability..................................................................................................................................... 49 
Figure 31: effect of crop price on groundwater consump on ............................................................ 50 
Figure 32: effect of agricultural produc vity on water consump on ................................................. 51 
Figure 33: effect of crop water requirement per ha on groundwater resources ................................. 52 
Figure 34: shi ing burden archetype in agriculture sector ................................................................. 53 
Figure 35: reinforcing loop of percep on about having illegal well .................................................... 54 
Figure 36: effect of alloca ng more surface water to the agriculture sector ...................................... 55 
Figure 37: rela onship between water used in irriga on and yield (produc vity) .............................. 55 
Figure 38: Gradual shrinkage of Lake Urmia in less than 15 years [50] ............................................... 56 
Figure 39: water price in different countries [51] .............................................................................. 58 
Figure 40: effect of water price on groundwater withdrawal ............................................................. 58 
Figure 41: Electricity consump on in agriculture sector (1978-2016) ................................................ 59 
Figure 42: effect of electricity price on groundwater withdrawal....................................................... 60 
Figure 43: effect of pumps technology and efficiency on groundwater withdrawal ........................... 62 
Figure 44: effect of operating cost on groundwater withdrawal ........................................................ 63 
Figure 45: effect of irriga on efficiency (IE) on groundwater withdrawal .......................................... 64 
Figure 46: effect of irrigation efficiency on irrigated land .................................................................. 65 
Figure 47: effect of shrinking irrigated land size and improving irrigated efficiency at the same  me 
on groundwater withdrawal ............................................................................................................. 66 
Figure 48: result of comprehensive plan to maximize irriga on efficiency in the year 150 ................. 67 
Figure 49: maximiza on of irrigated efficiency and keeping irrigated land constant .......................... 67 
Figure 50: effect of changing water governance on groundwater withdrawal.................................... 70 
Figure 51: linear thinking about the effect of improving irrigation efficiency ..................................... 74 
Figure 52: how improving irriga on efficiency worsens the water over-pump ................................... 74 
Figure 53: rela onship between “pump head” and “pump power” ................................................... 76 
Figure 54: Running Model ................................................................................................................. 90 
Figure 55: Water Table Capacity........................................................................................................ 91 
Figure 56: Return Frac on................................................................................................................. 92 
Tragedy of the Commons in Groundwater Resources 
8 
 
Figure 57: Electricity Consump on .................................................................................................... 93 
Figure 58: Irriga on Efficiency ........................................................................................................... 94 
Figure 59: desired irrigated land ....................................................................................................... 95 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1: no correla on between Water Footprint and price [37] ....................................................... 29 
Table 2: correla on between growth rate and water footprint (m3/ha) [8] ....................................... 30 
Table 3: suggested policies to manage over withdrawal of groundwater resources ........................... 43 
Table 4: Some studies in the field of water management using the dynamics of a systems approach 85 
Table 5: studies in the field of water management using the dynamics of systems focusing on the 
case of Iran ....................................................................................................................................... 88 















Tragedy of the Commons in Groundwater Resources 
9 
 
PART I: Introduction 
 
 In this part, first, we bring an introduction to the water consumption and agriculture 
sector in Iran. Then, we define our purpose of doing this research and the method that we 
intend to apply. Before going further, to make sure that our efforts are not in vain to reinvent 
the wheel, we will review the literature and conducted studies. When we ensure that our 
work is novel, we speak out the resources of needed data. The steps are depicted in the 





 At present, 37 countries (including Iran) face "extremely high" levels of water stress, 
meaning that annually more than 80 percent of the water available to agricultural, domes c, 
and industrial users is withdrawn from groundwater resources [1]; 50% of the people in sub‐
Saharan Africa currently have no access to improved water sources [2]; and it is estimated that 
by 2025, two billion people will be living in regions with absolute water scarcity [3]. Water 
crisis is so serious that the former United Nations Secretary‐General, Kufi Annan, believes 
“fierce competition for freshwater may well become a source of conflict and wars in the 
future”[4], and the “World Economic Forum” survey shows that for the next 10 years, the 
number one risk is water crisis [5] (the fourth case is food that also is rooted in the water 
problem). 
 One of the main culprits of the overconsumption of water in Iran, and the world is the 
agricultural sector. To illustrate, the water and agriculture sector in Iran will be explained in 
the following. 
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1.1. A glance at water consumption in Iran 
 
 Based on the FAO report, more than 90 percent of water withdrawal is used in the 
agriculture sector, and 57% of water withdrawal is from groundwater resources [6]. Going to 
the depth, based on the report prepared by Stanford University, Iran is known as one of the 
dry areas of the world. Most of the country (more than 70 percent), is arid and about 25 
percent is semi‐arid. So Iran has a little precipitation. Moreover, it has a “spatial” problem, 
and only 25% of its precipita on occurs in plains, and 75% does in mountainous and 
highlands. Worst, it has “temporal” problem as well, that is, 75% of the water is falling when 
we do not necessarily need it for irrigation, and the rainy season does not coincide with the 
cultivation, and during summer there is no effective rainfall [7]. As a result, while the share of 
rain‐fed food produc on is 60% in the world, it is only 11% in Iran. So the size of irrigated 
agriculture is large in Iran, and surface water can support only 38% of that, and the rest 62% 
is withdrawn from groundwater resources. In other words, agriculture is responsible for more 
than 90% of groundwater consump on in Iran [6]. 
 Another important feature of water consumption in Iran’s agriculture is that due to 
high subsidy granted to water and energy, this part has not had enough motivation to 
become efficient. “Inappropriate crop pattern” and “low irrigation efficiency” cause the 
efficiency in agriculture to be about 30% percent (about 92% of irriga on technique is surface 
irrigation) [6]. 
 
1.2. A glance at the agricultural sector in Iran 
 
 Agricultural produc on is about 10% of Iran’s GDP, and about 20% of employment is 
in the agriculture sector. Total cultivated land has increased from 9.47 million hectares in 
1978 to 12.16 million hectares in 2013 (Fig.1) [8]. The report released by Iran’s Ministry of 
Agriculture [8] shows that during the last years, rain‐fed farmlands has been constant and the 
agricultural land has increased only 28%, nevertheless agricultural production has increased 
more than fivefold (Fig.1 and Fig.2). Another repot shows “While the total cultivated cropland 
area has been fluctua ng around 12 million ha over the past 25 years, the average crop yield 
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has increased from 2.8 to 6.4 ton/ha — giving rise to an increase in the annual crop 
produc on from 29 to 74 million ton between 1990 and 2015. Nevertheless, the yield and 
production tonnage of the cereals — which account for 80% of the harvested croplands — 
have virtually stayed flat and the rise in the average crop yield and total production is solely 
due to the increase in the production of vegetables (sabzijät and jälizi) and fodder. This 
marked shift in cropping pattern has significantly exacerbated Iran’s water problems as 
majority of these crops are highly water demanding. In addition to the field crops, 
hor culture and orchards encompass 2.6 million ha of Iran’s land with an average yield of 6.4 
ton/ha, supplying about 16 million ton of orchard products per year”. [7] 
 
Figure 1: Agricultural Land (1987-2013)[8] 
 
 
Figure 2:  Agricultyral produc on (1978-2013) [8] 
 
 Another important feature of Iran’s agriculture sector is that “wheat” is a strategic 
crop in Iran, and for this reason, about 50% of the cul vated land is allocated to it and it is 
about 14% of total agricultural products. Other most cultivated crops are maize, sugar beet, 
tomato, watermelon, alfalfa, potato, sugar cane, barley, and rice. (figure.3, 4) [8] 
 
 
Figure 3: Crops Share of Land (2011) [8] 
 
Figure 4: Crops Share of Yield [8] 
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2. Research Objectives and Research Questions 
 
 This research aims to build a quantitative SD model in order to achieve more insight 
into the underlying structure (mechanism) of the tragedy of the commons in groundwater 
resources. System dynamics is chosen to study this problem as an essential project 
deliverable, which is a transparent model of causal mechanisms and the effects of different 
scenarios. Policymakers need an instrument that helps them to figure out the results of the 
policies they have in mind. The resulting model should provide the policymakers of Iran with 
actionable and practical intervention points which can control the groundwater over‐
withdrawing issue. 
The central questions which can steer the studies are as follows: 
1) What are the most important parameters affecting the groundwater consumption in 
Iran’s agricultre sector? 
2) How are those affecting parameters dynamically interconnected which lead to over‐
withdrawing and the tragedy of commons in grondwater resources? (in part II we will 
alobrate the concept of tragedy of the commns) 






 In this research, the tool of system dynamics is used. SD has been defined as “the use 
of informal maps and formal models with computer simulation to uncover and understand 
endogenous sources of system behavior” [9]. It includes problem articulation, boundary 
selection, formulation of a dynamic hypothesis, simulation model building, use of the 
simulation model to test the dynamic hypothesis, model validation, policy design and 
evaluation [10]. This modeling technique helps to understand how the behavior of a particular 
system is driven by its structure, which is formed by the causal relationships among variables 
[11]. 
Tragedy of the Commons in Groundwater Resources 
13 
 
 SD could be described as a mixed‐methods research strategy since it combines 
qualitative and quantitative elements [12,10]. SD is itself a broad research strategy and 
includes a range of approaches as classified and described by [13]. Considering the Research 
Objectives and Research Questions posed above, the SD research strategy to be adopted in 
this study resembles the “Phenomenon Replicating Explanation Strategy.” This focuses on 
using existing knowledge and empirical data to build a quantitative model capable of 
reproducing a reference mode of behavior which is used to compare scenarios for developing 
new policy insights. In this study, existing knowledge will be synthesized to produce a 
high‐level, aggregated model to clarify the structural mechanisms behind a system’s complex 
dynamics and identify strategic leverage points of policy interest. Given that an extensive 
archive of documented information already exists regarding the issue of health reform in Iran, 
this SD research strategy is considered appropriate for fulfilling the Research Objectives of 
this study. Components of other SD research strategies will be employed where existing 
knowledge is unavailable or still emerging. The SD model will be built using the Stella 
Architect software [14]. 
 
4. Literature Review 
 
 By searching the keywords of “water” and “agriculture” in the system dynamics 
bibliography (www.systemdynamics.org/bibliography) more than 300 ar cles are found. 
Moreover, since the subject of water and water management are related to many scientific 
disciplines, by searching those keywords plus “system dynamics” in google scholar, a wealth 
of studies can be found in the literature, in specialized journals of “sustainability”, 
“environment”, “water and wastewater”, “hydrology”, “agriculture”, etc. which are not 
mentioned in system dynamics bibliography. Besides, many articles are published in Persian in 
domestic journals.  In fact, the literature is so vast that it seems to review and to classify those 
demands Meta‐Analysis and other research. In Table.4 (Appendix A), some studies conducted 
on water issues are listed1. Then in Table.5 (Appendix A), we will review the studies focusing 
on the case of Iran. In the next step, we will classify these studies based on the “underlying 
                                                             
1 To prepare this section,  mainly the literature review of these ar cles are used: Mirchi et al. [60], Soltani and Alizadeh [76], 
Hosseini and Bagheri [68], Alami et al. [70] Salvitabar et al. [65] 
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model structure,” which “tragedy of the commons” is one of them. In the end, studies which 
are applied “tragedy of the commons” to investigate the water management will be 
examined. 
 
4.1. Classification of water studies based on Underlying Model Structure 
  
 In a general category, regardless of the method of building the model (e.g., 
participatory model building, combining SD with GIS,  multi‐criteria decision making, etc.), 
the studies can be divided into two major categories: (1) those concern about “quality of 
water” and water salinity and water contamination by  fertilizers, solid wastes, sewage 
drainage, etc. & (2) those concern about the “quan ty” of water. The models studying the 
quantity of water, in turn, can be divided into some categories. As follows, we categorize 
them in five groups, based on their underlying structure: 
  
i. Supply and Demand Model based on the Water Cycle and Material Flow Structure 
 
Figure 5: Water Cycle [15] 
 Many of the models mentioned above are based on the water cycle (Fig.5) and the 
material flow structure. They attempt to model the supply of water and the dynamics of 
water demand in different sectors (domestic, industrial, and agriculture). Some of these 
models are about a basin, river, city, or country, and some of them view the problem in the 
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global level and test different policies to bridge the gap between supply and demand. Also, 
some of them seek for solutions to manage the water crisis in natural disasters such as 
earthquakes and floods. 
ii. Supply and Demand Model considering Behavioral Feedbacks in addition to Material Flow 
Structure: 
 In these models, in addition to material flow, the way of decision‐making of some 
stakeholders, and their responses to different policies and situations are included in the 
model. For example, we can mention the model of Gohari A. et al. [16] (Figure 6). The model 
is about the Zayandeh‐Rud River basin, Iran, and comprises hydrological, socioeconomic, and 
agricultural sub‐systems. Agricultural land‐use decisions are assumed to be based on income‐
maximization. Ten crop types are included in the agricultural sub‐system, namely wheat, 
barley, potato, rice, onion, alfalfa, corn, garden products and vegetables, and cereal and 
legume. Land area for each crop is defined as a function of the corresponding net economic 
benefit in the previous year. The expected agricultural water demand is the sum of expected 
water demand for all crops. Because of water scarcity in the 
 
Figure 6:  Gohari, et al. model for the water crisis [16] 




basin, “delivery rate” is defined as the proportion of agricultural water demand that can be 
fully satisfied using available water supply. The land area for each crop is estimated by 
adjusting the expected land area for that crop based on the water delivery rate. Another good 
example for this catageory is Langarudi et al. [17] which eximine how does socioeconomic 
feedback matter for water models. 
 
iii. Water‐Energy‐Food Nexus: 
 These models (for example, Khalkhali et al. [18], & Bhatkoti et al. [19]) investigate the 
interaction between three sectors of food, energy, and water (Fig.7). The food sector is a 
large consumer of energy (>30%). Also, water is input to the energy sector as hydropower, 
cooling, biofuels …. In addition, energy is an input to water supply (desalination, water 
transport, air‐water …), and agriculture is input to renewable energy (biofuels). Moreover, 
Energy is a driver of water use (electrified irrigation), and the agriculture sector is the largest 
consumer of freshwater. 
 
Figure 7: water-food-energy nexus [20] 
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iv. Hydro‐Economy & Agro‐Economy model: 
 
 The models (e.g. Saysel & Barlas [21] & Saysek, Barlas, & Yenigün [22]) are a micro‐
founded integrated model of agriculture and water and include crop markets and trade, soil 
quality, precipitation pattern, temperature, etc. (Fig.8). 
 
Figure 8: hydro-economic model[23] 
v. Tragedy of the commons: 
 As far as the author finds, there are only two studies which focus on the tragedy of the 
commons in the case of water consumption; Khalid Saeed [24] and Ali Saysel [25]. 
 In Khalid Saeed’s model, the food production system of the Asian countries is 
characterized by the feedback loops shown in Figure.9 Food fulfills nutritional needs of the 
population; hence, food sufficiency is related to the average life expectancy. An increase in 
population expands the food consumption base. Consequently, food consumption is stepped 
up through intensive land use, high yielding seed varieties, and extensive irrigation‐all of 
which degrade land in the long run. Yield may also be increased or sustained through 
investment in land improvement, which is only resorted to after much damage has already 
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been caused. The model subsumes three subsystems: population, food production, and 
ecology. [24] 
 
Figure 9: Tragedy of the commons in Asian agriculture-Khalid Saeed (1991)[24] 
 Saysel & Mirhanoglu’s model consists of three subsystems: groundwater resource, 
irrigated land, and energy. It includes three main reinforcing loops and one balancing loop, as 





























Figure 10: Tragedy of Commons in Groundwater Resources- Ali Saysel (2018)[25] 
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5. Data Collection 
 
Data which is applied in this research can be divided into three categories: 
 
i. Structural Data:  
 Much of the Structural data were found in the literature. Secondary data were drawn 
from a literature review. A literature review enabled better understanding and analysis of the 
elements in the water system and factors that influence water crisis, thereby enriching the 
author's mental model of the water system. Reviewed literature included academic articles 
and books, institutional reports, and newspaper interviews with experts and authorities. This 
literature was obtained from the Internet. Selection of literature from journals was primarily 
based on the use of keywords (e.g., 'water management'; ‘water crisis’; 'agriculture; 'tragedy 
of the commons'; ‘common‐pool resources’). In addition, part of the journal articles is 
selected by means of backward and forward snowballing (i.e., the use of a paper's reference 
list to identify additional papers). Besides, wherever it was unclear and ambiguous, we asked 
them from either agriculture or water experts to gain a better understanding. 
 
ii. Statistical Data:  
 To compare model behavior with real data, this paper employs statistical and time‐
series data published by FAO, the ministry of agriculture, the Central Bank of Iran, and the 
Statistical Center of Iran. 
 
iii. Data to Calibrate the Model: 
 Regarding data to calibrate the model & data for table functions, in the first step, is 
selected by guess. Then after building the running model and doing sensitivity tests, if the 
system was sensitive to them, we tried to find more accurate data referring to studies and 
statistics. In some cases that finding real data was very difficult and time‐consuming, we 
assumed different numbers for the parameters and the system behavior is investigated under 
various scenarios. 
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PART II: Conceptual Model 
 
 In this and two following parts, the five‐step disciplined process of building an SD 
model will be followed, which is (1) ar cula ng the problem to be addressed, (2) formula ng 
a dynamic hypothesis or theory about the causes of the problem, (3) formula ng a simula on 
model to test the dynamic hypothesis, (4) tes ng the model un l you are sa sfied it is 
suitable for your purpose, and (5) designing and evalua ng policies for improvement ([10], 
P.86).  
 This part contains four sec ons, including (1) introduc on (2) problem defini on (3) 
hypothesis and conceptual model, and (4) boundaries and assumptions  
 
 
6. Background: Tragedy of the Commons 
  
 The problem of excessive exploitation and the depletion of a common‐pool resource 
arises when numerous individuals or communities use at the same time and in a collective 
way the same resource without excluding anyone of its use and trying to obtain the most 
advantage of its exploitation, causing the depletion of the common resource. This non‐
systemic behavior is caused because the individuals that are receiving benefits from the 
common‐pool resource, behave in an individualistic way and care less about the 
consequences of their actions on the collective well‐being [26]. With open access to a 
common resource, the benefits of over‐exploitation accrue to the individual while the costs 
are borne by all. The inappropriate incentives lead to the "tragedy of the commons" [27]. 
 There are countless examples of overexploitation of renewable resources such as fish, 
whales, pastures, forests, complex habitats for biodiversity, and groundwater, as well as of 
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resources that serve as regenera ve sinks for pollu on such as SO2, NO2, CO2, industrial 
chemicals, pesticides, and nutrients. A related economic problem is overbuilding of harvesting 
capacity and low capacity utilization. Since Aristotle, there has been an awareness of the 
commons problem as a cause of this overutilization. In modern times, Gordon [28] and Hardin 
[29] formalized and contributed to awareness of the commons problem or the ‘‘tragedy of 
the commons’’[30]. Earlier references such as Aristotle, Lloyd [31], Warming [32] and Pigou 
[33] indicate that the basic idea is not new. Ostrom [34] uses the term "appropriation 
problem," indicating the need to design rules and institutions to allocate rights and 
responsibilities. The commons problem is widely held to be the cause of mismanagement of 
common renewable resources [27]. 
 
7. Problem Definition 
 As men oned, Iran is one of those 37 countries which currently faces "extremely high" 
levels of water stress. In fact, water use has exceeded available surface supply and caused 
decreasing groundwater tables. The groundwater resources have depleted during the last two 
decades (figure.11), and if unrestricted groundwater use is continued, available groundwater 
will most likely be exhausted. 
 
Figure 11: Groundwater Depletion [35] 
 One of the main reasons for this phenomena is the improvement of water pump 
technology, which allowed this withdrawal to take place. Besides, As Figure.12 shows, during 
the last 30 years, the number of wells has also increased from about 90,000 to about 650,000. 
Increase in number of wells and development in the pump technology has caused about 100 
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billion cubic meters of groundwater resources are consumed in less than 50 years. Needless to 
say, this trend is not sustainable, and sooner or later, Iran will face severe problems in water 
and food security. [35] 
 
Figure 12: number of wells [35] 
8. Dynamic Hypothesis 
 
 The logic and the main idea used in this hypothesis is that farmers decide on how 
much their land is cultivated each year based on "profitability" and "available water." It is 
worth noting that farmers, in addition to the size of the farmland, also have to decide on the 
type of product which is ignored in this model, and to simplify it is embedded in the decision 
of the size of the land in some way (detailed explanations are brought in the section of Model 
Boundaries and Assumptions). 
Part One: Relationship between “Irrigated Land” & “Water Withdrawal” 
 Farmers, like other business owners, are interested in raising their production capacity 
when their business becomes more profitable. As shown in Fig.13, firstly based on the 
“profitability” (that is, “Revenue‐Cost Ratio” abbreviated by “R / C Ratio”), a “desired Irrigated 
Land based on Profitability” is created in the minds of the farmers. This variable, in turn, also 
indicates the “desired available water.” Some part of this “desired available water” is provided 
by “available surface water” and “treated and reused wastewater”, and farmers, to provide 
remaining proportion, will dig wells and withdraw water from “groundwater resources.” In 
other words, the “desired Irrigated Land” dictates “desired water” and subsequently “desired 
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number of wells”. The discrepancy between “number of wells” and “desired number of wells” 
makes up a negative loop adjusting “number of wells”. The “number of wells”, in turn, 
determines the amount of “withdrawal” and “available water”. 
 
Figure 13: Dynamic Hypothesis-Part (1) 
  
 However, “available water” does not always equal “desired water”, and consequently 
the size of “Irrigated Land” does not always same to “desired Irrigated Land based on 
Profitability”. Ultimately, the amount of water available to the farmer, that is, “available 
water”, will determine “max possible Irrigated land based on water availability”, and the gap 
between this number and “irrigated land“ makes another goal‐seeking loop which changes 
the size of “irrigated land”. The “irrigated land”, also, sets “total yield” and “revenue”. 
 These rela onships form a posi ve loop (R1) that wants to exponen ally increase the 
size of “irrigated land” and “revenue”; 
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 R1- Business Development: Irrigated Land & HWD Share  Total Yield  Revenue  
R/C Ratio  Desired Irrigated Land & HWD Share based on Profitability  Desired Water  
Number of Wells  Withdrawal  Available Water  Possible Irrigated Land & HWD Share 
based on Water Availability  Irrigated Land & HWD Share 
 On the other hand, by increasing the size of “irrigated land”, “operating costs” 
(including the cost of seed, fertilizer, labor recruitment, etc.), the amount of “withdrawal” 
water, the “cost of consumed water”, and the “cost of electricity”. Obviously, the lower the 
“level of water”, a stronger pump (with higher suction head) will be needed to pump water 
from groundwater resources on the ground increase, which naturally consumes more 
electricity. It should be noted that here the amount of withdrawal per well is assumed to be 
constant, and instead of changing the amount of “withdrawal per well” with changing the 
“level of water”, the same amount of water is extracted, by using more powerful pumps 
consuming more electricity.  
 These relationships also form three negative loops that attempt to stop and control 
the exponen al growth of R1: 
 B1: more Withdrawal  less Groundwater Resources  less Water Level  more 
Electricity Cost  more Costs  less R/C Ratio  less Desired Irrigated Land & HWD Share 
based on Profitability  less Desired Water  less Number of Wells  more Withdrawal 
 B2: more Withdrawal  more Water Cost  more Costs  less R/C Ratio  less 
Desired Irrigated Land & HWD Share based on Profitability  less Desired Water  less 
Number of Wells  less Withdrawal 
 B3: more Withdrawal  more Available Water  more Possible Irrigated Land & HWD 
Share based on Water Availability  more Irrigated Land & HWD Share  more Operating 
Cost  more Costs  less R/C Ratio  less Desired Irrigated Land & HWD Share based on 
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Part Two: Recharge of Groundwater Resources  
 The previous paragraph discussed the factors affecting the amount of extracted water 
from underground aquifers. Yet, how do underground aquifers feed? And what are the 
factors and mechanisms behind it? 
 “Groundwater recharge or deep drainage or deep percolation is a hydrologic process, 
where water moves downward from surface water to groundwater. Recharge is the primary 
method through which water enters an aquifer. This process usually occurs in the vadose 
zone below plant roots and, is often expressed as a flux to the water table surface. Recharge 
occurs both naturally (through the water cycle) and through anthropogenic processes (i.e., 
"artificial groundwater recharge"), where rainwater and or reclaimed water is routed to the 
subsurface. Groundwater is recharged naturally by rain and snow melt and to a smaller extent 
by surface water (rivers and lakes). Recharge may be impeded somewhat by human activities 
including paving, development, or logging.” [36]  
 In the model, natural recharge are considered by “total consumed water” and 
“rainwater 
penetration”, also artificial recharge is considered by adding variable of “recharge policy” to 
the model. As shown in figure.14, some of “total consumed water” for irrigation is absorbed 
by the plants, some is evaporated, some flowing and joins runoffs, and a percentage of it 
penetrate the soil and “recharge” the aquifers. That what fraction of water will return to 
groundwater resources depends on the density and permeability of the soil. When the “level 
of water” drops down, land subsides, the soil becomes denser, and the permeability and 
“return fraction” decreases. On the other hand, “water table capacity” is not constant but with 
the consumption of water and the lowering of “level of water”, part of the aquifer will be 
destroyed resulting in shortening the “water table capacity”.  




Figure 14: Dynamic Hypothesis-Part (2) 
 
These relationships make two other reinforcing loops (R2 and R3), as follows: 
 R2‐ Aquifer Destruction: Groundwater Resources  Water Level  Land 
Subsidence  aquifer storage capacity  Recharger  Groundwater Resources 
 R3‐ Soil Compaction: Groundwater Resources  Water Level   aquifer material 
compaction  soil porosity   absorption fraction  Recharge  Groundwater 
Resources 
 
Part Three: Irrigation Efficiency 
 Another important variable that should be added to the model is “irrigation 
efficiency”. As shown in Fig. 15, the “irrigation efficiency” has an adverse effect on two 
variables of the model, namely, “total consumed water” and “desired water”. Also, it has a 
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direct impact on “Max Possible Irrigated Land based on Water Availability”; to explain, the 
more irrigation efficiency, the more land can be cultivated, with a constant amount of 
“Available Water”. 
Sector 1: Irrigated Land
Sector 2: Profit

































Max Possible Irrigated Land



































Figure 15: Dynamic Hypothesis-Part (3) 
 
 But by what mechanism does irrigation efficiency change? And what factors 
encourage farmers to improve irrigation technology to increase irrigation efficiency? 
 One model assumption is that the main reason for the lack of irrigation efficiency 
improvement in recent decades has been the cheapness and abundance of water. So, as long 
as the water is abundant and cheap, there is no incentive to increase irrigation efficiency. But 
with rising costs, farmers will try to get the most benefit from the expensive extracted water 
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and will try to produce the most possible product and income to meet the costs. Thereby, a 
decrease in “R/C Ratio” encourage them to upgrade irrigation technologies and increase 
“irrigation efficiency”. 
 Adding these rela onships to the previous rela onships, two more nega ve loops (B4 
and B5) are added to the model that affect the irriga on efficiency: 
 B4: Efficiency of Irrigation  Desired Water  Number of Wells  Withdrawal  
Costs  R/C Ratio  Efficiency of Irrigation 
 B5: Efficiency of Irrigation  Possible Irrigated Land & HWD Share based on Water 
Availability  Irrigated Land & HWD Share  Total Yield  Revenue  R/C Ratio  
Efficiency of Irrigation 
 
9. Model Boundaries & Assumptions 
 
9.1. Model Boundaries: 
 
1. This research is about “quantity” of water, not “quality”, so water “salinity” and 
“contamination” are out of our boundary. 
2. It is about “groundwater” and does not include dynamics of “surface water” 
3. Our focus is on farmers’ behavior regarding “water extraction” to increase their 
production and maximize their profits, so other affecting factors like “soil quality”, 
“fertilizer”, “working force”, “machinery”, etc. are out of our boundary. 
 
9.2. Basic Assumptions 
1. As mentioned earlier, farmers should make two major decisions based on “profitability” 
and “available water”: (1) the size of land under cul va on (2) type of crops to cultivate. 
To understand how farmers make decisions, we need to know how they will react when 
more water is available. Do they increase the size of land under cultivation or switch to 
higher water demand crops? 
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 The 2015 Iran’s ministry of Agriculture report [8] shows that despite the increasing 
number of wells, agricultural water consumption, and a fivefold increase in crop yields, 
over the past 30 years, the size of land under cul va on has increased by only 28% (Fig.16 
and Fig.17). 
 
Figure 16:  Agricultural Land (1987-2013) [8] 
 
Figure 17: Agricultural Produc on (1987-2013) [8] 
 
 This indicates that farmers are moving towards crops that have higher water 
consumption and higher yields per hectare, rather than increasing the size of land under 
cultivation. 
 But what is the cause of this reaction? Why are farmers turning to high‐water‐demand 
crops if available water increases? Whether they have a higher price? 
Table 1: no correlation between Water Footprint and price [37] 
 
  
 As shown in Table.1, there is no meaningful rela onship between water footprint and 
the price of crops. Therefore, the tendency towards to plant more water‐consuming crops 
cannot be due to higher prices. Albeit, it seems to be rational, because when water is very 
cheap, naturally the amount of water consumption has no significant impact on the price of 
crops. 
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 Another potential reason can be since “Profit = Land * Yield per ha * Price” farmers 
cultivate crops with higher yield per hectare (which consume more water) to maximize their 
profit. 
 Table.2 confirms this claim. It shows that crops with higher water consump on give 
more crop per hectare (in terms of weight), which can increase farmers' income. For example, 
the tomato and potato crops that have grown the most in the last 36 years (6.5 percent and 
5.5 percent per year, respec vely) produce 29 and 21 tons per hectare, respec vely2. 
 
Table 2: correlation between growth rate and water footprint (m3/ha) [8]3 
 
 
 Regarding “crop selection”, to simplify, it can be assumed that farmers have to choose 
only between cul va ng of two crops instead of choosing among more than 100 crops; one is 
the low‐water‐demand crop (LWD) crop and the other is the high‐water‐demand crop (HWD). 
In fact, in SD, agents often aggregate, and although this can reduce model accuracy, it also 
makes the model easier to understand. In SD models, we do not seek to accurately predict 
numbers but seek to understand and more insight regarding the problem. Which is why in 
many cases, we are willing to sacrifice model accuracy for more insight, of course to the 
extent that it does not impair the validity of the model. For this reason, here, considering only 
two HWD and LWD products instead of the tens of products, seems to be a logical solution for 
model simplification. 
 However, including both decisions of “the size of irrigated land" and "share of HWD of 
irrigated land” not only makes the model a little messy but also creates some computational 
problems that we do not want to speak about here. What did we do to handle this problem? 
Some of the variables in the data can be aggregated to create appropriate model variables, 
                                                             
2 Please note the difference between water footprint (m3 / ha) and water footprint (m3 / ton) in the table above. 
3 The resource for the amount of “water footprint" is [38] and ”average growth rate” is extracted by the author from [8] 
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and some of these aggregations might even create abstract, intangible variables markedly 
different from those in the data (Khalid Saeed, 2003) [39]. 
 What we did is that we tried to merge both decisions into one. In a way that instead of 
having to decide about both the size of the land and the type of crop, the farmer only has to 
decide on one. For this purpose, for example, we can assume that “the size of land under 
cultivation is constant”, and the only decision farmers have to make is to choose between the 
share of each crop (HWD and LWD). Also, in order to see the impact of the increase in 
irrigated land size, “maximum amount of HWD considering the market demand” can be a 
little more than statistics. 
 As the second option, we can suppose “there is only one crop,” and the farmer only 
has to decide on the size of the land. In this case, in order to see the effect of cultivating HWD 
crop, we need to multiply the actual size of the land by a factor, to make equal water 
consumption (which is the main variable of our model). In this model used the second 
solution, and assume that there is only one crop and the farmer only has to decide on the size 
of the land. 
2. We assume that “price” is constant, and ignore “inflation”, because “inflation” affects both 
“revenue” and “costs” at the same time, and we use “revenue costs ratio”, so including or 
excluding it does not influence our results 
 
3. How much farmers produce, there is “demand” for it, and the increase in production will 
not lead to “supply surplus” and “price reduction”. Indeed, it is not much far away from 
reality; according to the project of Iran 2040 conducted by Stanford University [7] “the 
increase in agricultural productions over the past quarter century has not been able to 
keep pace with the increasing demands caused by rapid population growth, resulting in a 
downward trend in the net international trade of the country in this sector. In rough 
terms, the net value of agricultural import (i.e., ~ $5B) is equal to 14% of Iran’s current oil 
export gross revenue” (Fig.18). 
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PART III: Simulation Model 
 
 The third part of this thesis presents the simulation model as a product of the data 
collection and analysis in the second part of this thesis and refers back to the foundation that 
is established in the first part of this thesis.  
 This part, as shown in the below picture, contains three sections. First, we present 
selected model formulas. Then, we assess the credibility of the model by doing internal and 
external validity tests. When we become sure that the model generates the “right output 
behavior for the right reasons,” we will run the model to find out what will happen if we do 
nothing (‘business‐as‐usual’ scenario). Afterward, we will test suggested proposals to 
investigate their effectiveness and discover the best policy(s) to manage the over‐extraction 
of groundwater resources.  
 
10.Running Model & Selected Model Formulatios 
 To see the running model and full model documentation please refer to Apendix (B) 
and Appendix (C). 
 
11.Model Credibility 
 System dynamics modelers have developed a wide variety of specific tests to uncover 
flaws and improve models ([10], p.858). Model credibility testing aims to assure that the 
model is an acceptable description of the real system with respect to the dynamic problem. 
Model testing is executed in two steps: structure and output behavior testing. Behavior 
pattern tests are designed to measure how well the model can reproduce the major behavior 
patterns of the real system. Structure test checks whether the structure of a model is a 
meaningful description of the real relations that exist in the problem. In the model, all 
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parameters and variables have real‐life counterparts. The model is dimensionally consistent in 
all equations. These are examples of direct structure tests. One typical indirect structure 
testing is an extreme condition simulation. In order to check the validity of model structure, 
selected extreme conditions are simulated [40]. 
 An important point in this regard is that similar to the quality of the product that must 
be “built into” the product in the design phases (both product design and process design) and 
the quality cannot be “inspected in”, model credibility as a process, rather than an outcome 
as well (Barlas, 1996) [40]. Although some degree of validation takes place in every stage of 
modeling (and that validation cannot be entirely formal and objective), it is safe to state that a 
significant portion of “formal” validation activities take place right after the initial model 
formulation has been completed and before the policy analysis/ design step [40]. 
 Among many tests for model valida on, seven most used are selected, namely, (1) 
Boundary Adequacy (2) Structure and Parameter Confirma on (3) Dimensional Consistency 
(4) Integra on Error (5) Extreme and Direct Extreme Condi ons (6) Behavior sensi vity (7) 
Behavior Reproduction. In this research, I will apply all of them to test the validation of the 
model. 
 
11.1. Boundary Adequacy: 
 
 For the boundary adequacy test, the guiding question is: does the model include all 
relevant structures needed for fulfilling the purpose of the model? Therefore, the purpose of 
the model is reviewed. The purpose of the model is to answer the research question: “how 
are the factors associated with the groundwater over‐withdrawing dynamically 
interconnected?” In addition, it needs to be possible to test policies. For every policy, one or 
multiple model elements have been introduced (i.e., irrigation efficiency, land size, etc.), 
thereby satisfying the purpose of the model. In addition, an assessment of possible model 
extensions based on data collection is performed. It is certain that the implementation of 
additional qualitative and quantitative data (e.g., those are brought in suggestions for future 
research) would make the model fit better with reality and thus improve validity. However, 
the increase in understanding of the dynamics to which the system is subject in comparison 
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with required additional data is expected to merely contribute. Based on these arguments, it 
can be concluded that the model boundary is adequate for the purpose of the model. 
11.2. Structure and Parameter Confirmation: 
 
 The test checks that the model has no dummy “scaling” parameters that have no 
meaning in real life [41]. The model passes this test since its structure consistent with 
relevant descriptive knowledge of the system, and all parameters have operational, physical 
meaning and real‐world counterparts. 
11.3. Dimensional Consistency: 
 
 This test checks whether all equations are dimensionally consistent without the use of 
parameters having no real world meaning. Key in the dimensional consistency test is 
consistent use of units from input values (exogenous parameters and stocks) when writing 
equations in the model. With the help of the ‘Units check’‐function in the software, the 
reported outcome is ‘Units are OK.’ 
11.4. Integration Error: 
 
 The results are not sensitive to the choice of time step or numerical integration 
method (Euler, RK2, RK4, and Cycle Time). 
 
11.5. Extreme Conditions: 
 
 The extreme‐condition test is about verifying the response of the model to extreme 
conditions of each model parameter. All equations make sense even when their inputs take 
on extreme values, and the model responds plausibly when subjected to extreme policies, 
shocks, and parameters. In this part, selected extreme conditions are simulated. For example, 
if the groundwater resources is zero then number of wells will be zero & the irrigated land will 
only be to the extent that available surface water is able to support it, and if groundwater 
resources and available surface water are zero at the same time, the total yield & irrigated 
land will be zero. Extreme condition tests are also applied to Irrigated land. When it is zero, 
“total yield”, “number of wells”, and the amount of withdrawal are all zero. These and many 
other extreme condition tests yield results consistent with real‐life information 




11.6. Behavior Sensitivity:  
 
 Assumptions about parameters were changed over the plausible range of uncertainty 
(15%) to check whether outcomes change significantly or not. Sensitivity tests were done on 
(1) ini al value of stocks, (2) exogenous variables, & (3) lookup table func ons, and the result 
was as follow: 
 
A. Variables to them the system shows no/small numerical sensitivity 





Figure 19: the result of the sensitivity test on water price 
2 Water Price 
3 
Normal Irrigation Efficiency 
Growth 
4 Operating Cost per ha 
5 
Arable Land 
(Max Irrigated Land) 
6 
eff of R/C 
on IE growth 
7 
eff of water level 
on return fraction 
8 Available Surface Water 
 
 
 These parameters are neither attractive in terms of policy‐making, nor do we need to be 





Tragedy of the Commons in Groundwater Resources 
37 
 
B. Variables to them the system shows considerable numerical sensitivity 





Figure 20: result of sensitivity test on “max possible growth based on external 
limitations” 
2 Number of Wells 




5 Rainwater Penetration 
6 Normal return fraction 
7 
Max Possible growth based 
on external limitations 
 
 The general pattern of model behavior (overshoot & collapse) does not change, but the 
time of overshoot and deletion changes. For example, the higher the water resources, the 
later groundwater resources will be depleted (when it is the infinity, it never gets 
depleted) 
 
C. Variables to which the system is very sensitive (numeric or behavioral) 
1 






Figure 21: result of sensitivity test on “eff of water level water table capacity 
(WTC)” 
2 Yield per ha 
3 Price of Crop 
4 
Normal Electricity 
Consumption per Liter 
Water 
5 Electricity Price 
6 
eff of water 
level on WTC (Water Table 
Capacity) 
7 
eff of water level 
on EC 
8 
desired growth based on 
profitability 
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 Parameters that showed high sensitivity were checked in the first step if the real system 
would exhibit similar high sensitivity to the corresponding parameters. After that, once we 
ensured, we spent more time and effort to estimate their value more accurately. On the 
other hand, highly sensitive parameters were selected as candidates for policymaking (we 
will refer to them in the last section, that is, “policy analysis” and talk about them in more 
detail). In cases, that system is highly (behavioral or numerical) sensitive, and we could 
not find exact values, we work with different assumptions there and use these 
assumptions as scenarios. 
 
11.7. Behavior Reproduction: 
  
 The model reproduces the behavior of interest in the system (Figure.22). This test is 
done to measure how accurately the model can reproduce the major behavior patterns 
exhibited by the real system. It is crucial to note that the emphasis is on pattern prediction 
(periods, frequencies, trends, phase lags, amplitudes …), rather than point (event) prediction. 
This is a logical result of the long‐term policy orientation of system dynamics models. 
Furthermore, since such models, starting with a set of initial conditions, create the dynamic 
behavior patterns endogenously (not dictated by external input functions), it can be shown 
that even “perfect” structures may not yield accurate point prediction [40]. 
 Note that, if a model is judged to fail the behavior pattern tests, we return once again 
back to work on “model revisions.” But in this case, since confidence in the model structure 
must have been already established, model revisions involve parameter/input changes, rather 






Figure 22: behavior reproduction test 
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(the left picture is the outpot of the model and the right one is the reference mode) 
 Regarding behavior reproduction test we should notice some important points. One, a 
model can never really reproduce the data. It should reproduce relevant behavior but this 
relevant behavior might be only partially reflected by the data.  Indeed, it is crucial to note 
that the emphasis is on pattern prediction (periods, frequencies, trends, phase lags, 
amplitudes ...), rather than point (event) prediction. This is a logical result of the long‐term 
policy orientation of system dynamics models. Furthermore, since such models, starting with 
a set of initial conditions, create the dynamic behavior patterns endogenously (not dictated 
by external input functions), it can be shown that even “perfect” structures may not yield 
accurate point prediction [40]. another point is that a reference mode is different from a 
precise time history in that it represents a pattern incorporating only a slice of the history 
[42]. Although historical behavior and a reference mode can be expressed in either 
quantitative or descriptive terms, a reference mode is essentially a qualitative and intuitive 
concept because it represents a pattern rather than a precise description of a series of events 
[43]. Simply stated, reference mode is a “qualitative pattern”. The graphs included in it should 
explain all “turning points” in it and lead to the dynamic hypothesis. Your model must 
replicate the qualitative pattern articulated in the reference mode. Matching historical data 
would be irrelevant as historical data is generated by a very complex system of relationships 




 In the following, the built model has been used to evaluate various strategies for 
avoiding the depletion of groundwater resources. For this purpose, “gap analysis” has been 
used. In gap analysis, the future under the present strategy (business as usual) is forecasted. 
Then, objectives or desired future is identified and the gap between the objectives and the 
future conditions under the current strategy is determined. Finally, new strategies which will 
help to close the gap will be designed [44]. 
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 So, in the following lines, we first discuss what will happen if we do nothing. Then, we 
will list a collection of intervention policies. And in the end, we will examine the impact of 
these policies to find the best ones. 
 
12.1. Business‐as‐Usual (B.a.U.) Scenario 
  
 One of the conclusions gained in the sensitivity analysis is that the fate of groundwater 
resources depends on the soil properties, which manifest itself in “eff of water on WTC”. If the 
soil is loose and the reservoir resistance against destruction is low, it is expected that the 
reservoir easily degrades and dies by lowering the water level in the reservoir. But what about 
when the soil is very hard? 
 Since the soil properties can considerably affect the behavior and upshot of the 
system, and it is not so easy to find accurate data for that, we investigate business‐as‐usual 
scenario under two different condi ons: (1) when the aquifer wall is very hard (like a rock), 
and will not destruct when the water level goes down, in other words, the water table 
capacity is fixed; (2) when water table capacity is eroded. The advantage of this work is that 
the model results can be applied to different regions of the world with different soil strength. 
12.1.1. Business‐as‐Usual Scenario (I) ‐ CC is fixed: 
 
 As can be seen in the figure.23, in this case ini ally the reinforcing loop of R1 is 
dominant and “number of wells” increases exponentially. But no growth can continue to 
infinity without being constrained. Meanwhile, the power of negative loops is increasing 
gradually from moment to moment. These negative loops try to limit the exponential growth 
to carrying capacity, so after a specific point, dominant loop shifts, and the model starts to 
show an S‐shaped behavior. Nevertheless, due to the existence of time delays in these 
negative loops, the state of the system will overshoot and oscillate around the carrying 
capacity (400,000 wells & 150*109 m3 groundwater resources). To make sure this equilibrium 
is stable, we increased the model time horizon to 1000 and no change was observed. The 
number of wells and groundwater resources tends to oscillate with an average periodicity of 
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about 40 years. The oscilla on is quite lightly damped, requiring about 100 years for 




















Figure 23: business-as-usual scenario-CC is fixed 
  
 Figure.24 can help us to understand the sources of the damped oscillation. The phase 












Figure 24: phase plot for the number of wells 
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Figure 25: business-as-usual scenario-water capacity is eroded 
 
 In this case, the positive loop is dominant at the first, farmers are constantly 
exreacting more water, making more profit, and cultivating more land. Withdrawn water is 
offset by “recharge” and no noticeable change is seen in “groundwater resources”. But 
suddenly when it passes the maximum sustainable yield (MSY)4 point, it collapses. Since in 
practice the capacity of the table is not constant, based on what is shown in the picture.25, it 
can be concluded that if the government does not take urgent measurements, overshoot and 
collapse will occur, groundwater resources will be depleted, and the country will face serious 
food and water insecurity.  
 As mentioned, the second scenario is nearer to the reality, so in the following we will 
use the second one for policy analysis. Albeit, in the end, we can check how the following 
policies can affect the system under the first scenario, then compare how the promising 
policies are robust under these two different constellations of water table capacity. 
  
12.2. Policies to Manage Groundwater Crisis 
 
The proposed policies can be broadly divided into three categories: 
                                                             
4 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maximum_sustainable_yield 
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 (1) Policies that focus on a par cular parameter of the model and a empt to control 
the behavior of the model by strengthening or weakening the existing loops. These policies 
seek to weaken loops that intensify water withdrawing and, on the other hand, to strengthen 
loops that seek to control withdrawal. The following table lists the names of the loops, the 
manipulable and policy variables within those loops, and the possible policies for managing 
those variables. 
 
Table 3: suggested policies to manage over withdrawal of groundwater resources  
Policy Variable  Loop 
1. shrinking agriculture size 
2. virtual water trade and 
shrinking the share of crops 
with higher water footprint 
Max Land Under Cultivation 
R1 
external limitations 
max growth based on 
external limitations (embedded in 
desired growth based on 
profitability & 
external limitations) 
price determination Price of Crop 
production efficiency by cultivation 
or harvesting technology or by 
genetic engineering 
Yield per ha 
genetic engineering Crop Water Requirements per ha 
limiting the number of wells & 
blocking unauthorized wells 
Number of Wells 
1. increasing the share of surface 
water for the agriculture sector  
2. treated wastewater for 
agriculture 
Available Surface Water 
price determination Water Price 
B1,2,3 
price determination Electricity Cost 
pump efficiency EC per liter water 
price determination operating cost 
modernization of irrigation Irrigation Efficiency B4, 5 
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 (2) Combined Policies: these policies aim to control system behavior by simultaneously 
managing multiple variables and the power of different loops. After investigating the above‐
listed policies separately, and gaining more insights, we will decide which policies could be 
combined. 
 (3) Changing the current structure: one solu on in this category can be changing 
water governance and constitution of the water market 
 
12.3. Evaluation of the Suggested Policies 
We will elaborately discuss each of the above‐mentioned policies as follows: 
12.3.1. Policy (1): Shrinking Agriculture Size 
 Not surprisingly shrinking agriculture can ameliorate groundwater depletion. In other 
words, having sustainable natural capital, the scale of human activities should be limited to a 
level that is compatible with the carrying capacity of natural capital. Excess expenditure over 
income will lead to bankruptcy. MSY is required to calculate the maximum irrigated for the 
system to remain stable. As shown in figure.26, if the size of irrigated land exceeds even 




Figure 26: effect of irrigated land on groundwater resource sustainability 
  
 As noted earlier, the size of the irrigated land is actually representative of two 
parameters: (a) the actual size of the irrigated land, and (b) the share of the high‐water 
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demand crops. So when it comes to agricultural downsizing, it can be implemented by either 
reducing the actual size of irrigated land or reducing the share of high‐water demand crops. 
Which of course, both of them have their own implementation challenges. Before more 
explanation, it worth‐mentioning that the concept of maximum sustainable yield is not always 
easy to apply in practice. Estimation problems arise due to poor assumptions in some models 
and lack of reliability of the data. 
 
 Implementation Challenges 
 
(i) Implementation challenges of virtual water trading: 
 To reduce the share of high water footprint crops, the government can guarantee the 
purchase of low water footprint crops at a higher price than high water footprint crops or can 
impose a higher tax on high water footprint crops. In addition, the government can prohibit 
the export of high‐water footprint crops (such as watermelon), or can import high‐water 
footprint crops at a lower price, leading to farmers have no incentive to cultivate them in the 
country. Nevertheless, there is some objection and insecurities in the virtual water trade. First 
of all, some countries which have a lot of water suffer from lack of proper land for agriculture 
(like Canada). Some other countries although benefit from enough water and land, due to the 
high salary of labors and environmental concerns they prefer to import agricultural products 
as well (like Japan). Moreover, besides 37 countries which face with high water stress, many 
other countries will face the same problem in near future (like China), which shift and impose 
a huge pressure on countries that export crops and virtual water (like Brazil), so, this trend is 
not sustainable.  
 
(ii) Implementation challenges for shrinking the actual size of irrigated land: 
1. Conflict of interest between Agriculture Ministry and Energy Ministry: the main goal of 
agriculture ministry is food security and self‐ sufficiency. So, whether both aims of water 
security and food security are achievable at the same time or not and they are mutually 
exclusive? They are not mutually exclusive if we can manage the “demand” by the 
following six proposed ways: 
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1.1.  Revising population growth policy: After the war with Iraq, due to the adopted population 
growth policies, the popula on of Iran has doubled (in 1980 it was 40 million, and in 2016 
it is 80 million). After the baby boom, Iran’s authorities adopted population reduction 
policies. Yet, after a while, as shown in below picture again they started encouraging 
people to have more children. One of their reasons is when the baby boom generation 
becomes re red need backing popula on (Fig.27 and Fig.28). 
 
 
Figure 27: Iran's Population [45] 
 
Figure 28 Iran Population Pyramid [45] 
 
 
 There is an urgent need for revisiting the new population growth policy in Iran. While 
the current age distribution of Iran’s population is undesirable and can have some long‐term 
socioeconomic impacts, the negative consequences of uncontrolled population growth and 
rapid urbanization can be much more significant. Optimizing the spatial distribution of the 
current population should be prioritized over improving the age distribution of the 
population. Major urban areas in Iran are already challenged by satisfying the needs of the 
existing population. Without major socioeconomic and political reforms to address the 
current imbalance of power and services throughout the country migration to major 
metropolitans will continue. So, the new population growth policies will just exacerbate the 
situation.[46] 
 
1.2.  Consuming less meat: Nowadays in most parts of the world people prefer meat to 
vegetables and this is bad news for water sources, as vegetables consume about 2000 
liters per kilo while red meats consume 15,000 kilos per kilo (more than 7  mes). Vanham 
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D. et al (2013) [47] by using the concept of "virtual water" show that people's “current 
diet” is 1000 liters more than a “healthy diet” and 1600 liters more than a “vegetarian 
diet”. That is, if people reduce their consumption of red meat and stick to a healthy diet, it 
can not only alleviate many health problems, including overweight and cardiovascular 
disease, which puts a lot of pressure on the Ministry of Health and the health budget. But 
it can greatly solve the problem of groundwater over‐extraction. However, in some places 
encouraging this policy may lead to other problems, such as overfishing, so it is necessary 
to formulate some plans for managing side effects beforehand. 
1.3.  Decreasing the food waste: Based on sta s cs, 35% of agricultural products is wasted 
which is equal to 3.9 billion cubic meters of water. For this purpose, the mentality and 
culture of people should be changed. 
 
1.4.  Using new food sources that consume less water, such as insect bread instead of wheat 
bread 
 
1.5. Finding a new method of agriculture by salty water5 
 
1.6.  Changing the definition of “self‐sufficiency”. It is not possible and ra onal to be 100% 
self‐sufficient in all agricultural products. Groundwater resources should be considered as 
strategic reserves for critical conditions and they should be maintained for times when the 
country may be under food siege. 
 
2. Unemployment rate: Agriculture is “labor‐intensive” and there are about 4 million farms in 
Iran, the shrinking agriculture sector will increase the unemployment rate dramatically. In 
fact, the current unemployment rate is about 12% and government cannot manage it, 
because creating jobs needs budget and government right now suffers deficit budget, and 
due to sanctions foreign investors are not willing to invest in Iran as well. Moreover, even 
the government can create job opportunities, farmers’ average ages is more than 50 in 
Iran, most of them are illiterate, and cannot do anything else farming. 
                                                             
5 please visit www.biosaline.org 
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3. Another challenge is the way of implementation. How does the government want to 
shrink the agricultural sector? Two approaches come to mind:  
a) Paying Money to farmers for “No Cultivation”; Lack of trust to the financial power of 
“Social Security” and income heterogeneity in different regions are two important 
challenges for this method.      
b) Buying farmlands; bargaining after buying farmlands of the first village and 
unemployment rate are important challenges in this method [48]. 
12.3.2. Policy (2): External limita ons 
 
 The lookup function defined for “desired growth based on profitability” also implicitly 
applied “max possible growth based on external limitations”. There are a number of external 
constraints that limit the growth of cultivated land, and if the “R/C Ratio” is ten, farmers 
cannot increase the cul vated land 10  mes overnight. Sensi vity analysis shows that this 
constraint and ceiling for irrigated land growth can have a significant impact on model 
behavior. That is to say, imposing restrictions on irrigated land growth per year and the 
growth of the share of high‐water demand (HWD) crops per year has a significant impact on 
system behavior. From another perspective, this variable can be considered as an indicator of 
the aggressiveness of farmers. If farmers are not too aggressive, and when their business is 
profitable, do not expand their irrigated land and HWD share maximally, as shown in 
figure.29, it seems the problem of groundwater depletion will be controlled, and at one point 





Figure 29: effect of max possible growth based on external limitations on groundwater resource sustainability 
(Time period = 300 years) 
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 Since the degree of farmers’ aggressiveness is an important variable, different 
scenarios can be analyzed in the business‐as‐usual section, based on the degree of 
aggressiveness of the farmers. The important question here is whether this solution to restrict 
growth by applying external constraints is a sustainable solution. To answer this question, we 
increase the  me period from 300 to 600 years and see (figure.30) although this problem can 






Figure 30: effect of max possible growth based on external limitations on groundwater resource sustainability 
(Time period = 600 years) 
 This conclusion seems reasonable since the main reason for the collapse is crossing 
the MSY. In this policy we do not consider the MSY, just slow down the speed of growth, but 
do not prevent it from crossing the MSY, and collapse will occur whenever it crosses that 
point. 
12.3.3. Policy (3): Price of Crop 
 
 In Iran, most farmers belong to the lower class of society who need to produce as 
many crops as possible to support their families. For this purpose, they have no way else 
digging more wells (authorized or unauthorized). In other words, digging well is often not 
because of the greed of the farmers and effort to accumulate more wealth, but because of 
the poverty and the need to dig wells to earn a living. With these explanations, it appears that 
an increase in the price of agricultural products by the government can not only improve the 
living condition of farmers but also eliminate their need to dig more wells to increase 
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production and provide a minimum standard of living. But can the policy of increasing the 
price of crops really prevent digging more wells and control the over‐extraction? 
 As can be seen in the figure.31, contrary to the above argument, the increase in the 
price of agricultural products not only does not control over‐extraction but also exacerbates 
the problem and groundwater resources will be depleted in a shorter time. The reason is that 
rising crop prices make the reinforcing loop of R1 more powerful. Therefore, it seems that in 
order to control over‐extraction, the prices of agricultural products should decrease, leading 
to decrease in profitability and a rac veness of agriculture. Figure.9 shows when the price of 
crops drop by 15%, the behavior of system changes and no longer collapse, and reaches a 
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Figure 31: effect of crop price on groundwater consumption 
 
12.3.4. Policy (4): Yield per ha 
 
 Another solution to reduce water consumption is to increase productivity by 
improving cultivation and harvesting technology, or using genetic engineering. By this way, 
with less water, more crop is produced, and since the increase in production will cause reach 
to the demand saturation point sooner. Contrary to this argument, the model shows 
(Figure.32) that with increasing agricultural productivity will exacerbate the over‐extraction 
problem. 







Figure 32: effect of agricultural productivity on water consumption 
 
 The reason is that by improving agricultural produc vity, the reinforcing loop of R1 will 
be amplified. So, it seems that controlling agricultural productivity will weaken this positive 
loop and postpone groundwater depletion. Amelioration of agricultural productivity although 
increase production (which seems to be a reasonable solution to meet growing demand), it 
increases “R / C Ratio” and disrupts one of the main growth, and worsens the over‐extraction 
problem. 
 In order to see the impact of this policy over a longer timeframe, the timeframe was 
extended to 1000 years but no change in model behavior was observed. It should be added 
that it is assumed that “crop price” is fixed and the amount of production has no effect on the 
price, also there is no demand saturation point and there is demand for whatever is produced 
(this was stated in the model assumptions). However, to improve the model results, we can 
add the effects of supply and demand on crop price. 
 
12.3.5. Policy (5): Crop Water Requirements per ha 
 
 Can genetic changes in crops, in a way that they consume less water for the same 
amount of yield, prevent groundwater depletion? It seems rational, since when we do an 
extreme test and assume “Crop Water Requirements per ha = 0”, water withdrawal will be 
zero, and the groundwater resources will remain pristine. 







Figure 33: effect of crop water requirement per ha on groundwater resources 
 However, when we change the amount of water needed per hectare to ± 50%, it is 
found that by decreasing the water requirement per hectare again the system will collapse 
(Figure.33). Interestingly, when we decrease the water requirement per ha, the starting time 
of collapse will be slightly delayed, but the speed and slope are higher than the initial state, 
and sooner the resources will be depleted and reach zero. Why? With the decrease in water 
requirement per hectare, the nega ve loops of B1 and B2 (driven by the costs of water and 
electricity) will be weakened, the reinforcing loop of R1 will be dominant more  me, and the 
size of irrigated land and share of HWD will be greater, causing more water extraction. 
 Two noteworthy points that, we increased the  me period to 1000 and no change in 
behavior was seen. Second, why and to what extent does the reduction in the water needed 
per hectare not lead to improvement? We will answer these questions in evaluating policy 13 
(irrigation efficiency). In fact, we can decrease needed water per hectare both by genetic 
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12.3.6. Policy (6): Permission for digging Wells 
 
 This method is similar to the shrinking of the agricultural sector (policy 1), and if the 
number of wells is defined to be smaller than the MSY, the groundwater problem can be 
controlled. 
 
 Implementation Challenges 
1. Politicians' desire for solutions that 
solve the problem faster (but not 
more radically): When there is a 
problem of water scarcity, the 
government can offer two 
solutions; one is creating new job 
opportunities for farmers and 
shrinking the size of the farm, and 
two is allowing digging more wells 
to meet needed water for 
agriculture. The first is time‐
consuming and costly, so it is not 
desirable for politicians seeking 
solutions to solve the problem 
quickly. Such short‐term solutions 
not only do not address the root 
cause of the problem but also 
allow it to go further and deeper 
(shifting burden or fix‐that‐fails 
archetype, Fig.34) 
 
Figure 34: shifting burden archetype in agriculture sector 
 
 
2. Increasing the number of unauthorized wells by decreasing the number of permitted 
wells, due to its light penalties and low risk. Increasing the number of unauthorized wells 
eliminates its ugliness and fear of digging illegal wells, and creates a positive loop as 
shown in figure.35. 





Figure 35: reinforcing loop of perception about having illegal well 
 
3. law enforcers’ lack of understanding about the importance of these rules and corruption 
[49]. 
 
4. Farmers' Resistance to blocking illegal wells: based on interviews, the livelihood of farmers 
is one of the most influential aspects of conservation measures and a significant 
propor on of farmers (according to interviewees ranging from 10% to 90%) depends on 
illegal wells to maintain their family's livelihood. One of the managers of the Ministry of 
Energy described the issue of farmers’ dependence on illegal wells in this way: “The 
farmer has his child's hand, hung over the well, saying either go or I will throw him into 
the well. Because that well is also his whole life ... " [49] 
 
12.3.7. Policy (7): increasing the share of surface water for agriculture sector 
 Could allocating more surface water reduce groundwater withdrawal and prevent it 
from being depleted? Contrary to the perception, as seen in figure.36, increasing the share of 
agriculture in surface water exacerbates the problem and speeds up groundwater over‐
extraction, and resources come to an end sooner. 







Figure 36: effect of allocating more surface water to the agriculture sector 
 The reason for this observation is when more surface water is available, farmers will 
not have to pay money for electricity and pumping water to the surface of ground, that is, R/C 
Ratio will become larger, the later costs will exceed revenues, and the later shifting dominant 
loop from the reinforcing loop R1 to nega ve loops happens. Which means, the reinforcing 
loop R1 will be dominant for a longer time, and more water will be extracted. Conversely, as 
can be seen in the above figure, with the reduction of the surface water, the negative loops 
gain more power and can prevent collapse behavior. We checked the outputs by expanding 
the  me horizon to 1000 years and no change in behavior observed. In order to this policy to 
be effective, it is necessary to control the size of irrigated land and the share of HWD crops, in 
this way by increasing the available surface water, the farmer cannot cultivate more land and 
HWD crops, therefore there is no reason to extract water from groundwater resources. 
Because excessive discharge will have an adverse impact on their harvest and profit 
(figure.37) 
 
Figure 37: relationship between water used in irrigation and yield (productivity) 
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 Implementation Challenges 
 Allocating more surface water to agriculture sector not only exacerbates the problem 
of over‐extraction, but it also accompanies some implementation problems and 
environmental consequences. Surface water is limited, and increasing the share of agriculture 
means decreasing the share of household, industry, or environment. Household share due to 
exponentially increase in population and urbanization not only is not reducible but also is 
increasing exponentially. But if people decrease their personal water consumption, this policy 
can be applied. Nevertheless, we should remember that household consump on is only 6% of 
total water consumption, and decreasing it cannot create a big effect on the depletion of 
groundwater which is used by agriculture. Another way is reducing the leakage in the 
distribution network. Regarding the industry share of surface water, similarly, since the 
government wants to improve GDP and decrease the unemployment rate for exponentially 
growing population, the industry share of surface water has been increasing during recent 
decades. So, the only practical way to increase the share of agriculture from surface water is 
decreasing the water share of the environment. The government by building dams over the 
last decades has tried to meet the water demand of agriculture and household, and caused 
serious environmental problems; the tragedy of Urmia is one of them. The shrinking the Lake 
is obvious in Fig.38: 
 
Figure 38: Gradual shrinkage of Lake Urmia in less than 15 years [50] 
  
 This drying up of lakes and wetlands has led to salt and dust storms in many parts of 
Iran that have created serious respiratory problems for people. Salt storms, in turn, are 
destroying the surrounding farmland, which could eventually force villagers and farmers to 
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migrate to cities, which in turn could exacerbate the water crisis in big cities, on the one hand, 
and expand shantytown and slum areas around big cities, causing more social problems. 
12.3.8. Policy (8): Treated Waste Water for Agriculture 
 
 Wastewater treatment and use that for agriculture, although does not have the 
environmental impacts mentioned above, it is still can aggravate the problem of over‐
extraction of groundwater resources unless the size of irrigated land and the share of HWD 
crops is controlled. The reason is that this policy will decrease the cost of electricity, increase 
R/C Ratio, and postpone shifting dominant loop from R1 to nega ve loops. Another point to 
note is that even with the control of irrigated land size and HWD crop share, this policy 
cannot make a paradigm shift in depletion of groundwater resources. Since as it was mentioned 
earlier, domestic water consumption is only 6% and this is a small number compared to the 




 Implementation Challenges 
 Financial Problem: due to sanctions Iran was not able to finance these projects from 
international banks, and at the same time since the water is almost free in Iran, no 
domestic investor is willing to invest in this industry. As seen before, the low price of 
water not only has caused inefficiency in agriculture but also hindered the development 
of water treatment 
12.3.9. Policy (9): Water Price 
 
 Another way to control the reinforcing loop ending to groundwater deple on (R1) is 
empowering the balancing loops by increasing the water and electricity prices. Figure.39 
depicts the water price for the agriculture sector in comparison to household and industry 
sectors; it shows except a few countries (like Netherlands and Austria) water for irrigation is 
very cheap. In Iran, despite the scarcity of water resources, the price of water for irrigation is 
0.0025 dollars/liter [52] and the price of electricity is 0.002 dollars/kwh [53]. 




Figure 39: water price in different countries [51] 
 Can rising water prices prevent over‐extraction? The figure.40 shows that the increase 
in agricultural water prices despite the heavy costs for the government (farmers' 
dissatisfaction and strikes), the system is not sensitive to that and does not make a big 
change, and if the government insists on controlling water extraction by this policy, it should 
make the water price at least five times. As can be seen, when the water price is four times 
higher, there is s ll no change, but when the water price is 5  mes higher, the behavior of the 
model changes and reaches equilibrium instead of collapse. Increasing this number from 5 to 
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Figure 40: effect of water price on groundwater withdrawal  
  
 Of course, it should be noted that this model assumes the crop price is fixed. 
However, with the decline in water availability or rising price of water and other production 
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inputs (such as electricity, etc.), the crop price will also be expected to rise. So, by adding the 
effect of production costs on crop price a more accurate result can be obtained from the 
model. 
12.3.10. Policy (10): Electricity Price 
 Due to the high subsidy of the government for water and electricity in agriculture and 
their very low price, water and electricity consumption is far from the optimal mode. As 
shown in Figure.41, the consumption of electricity in the agriculture sector has been ever 
increasing over the recent decades and currently the agricultural sector accounts for about 
15% of the country's electricity consumption [54]: 
 
Figure 41: Electricity consumption in agriculture sector (1978-2016) 
 Due to the increasing electricity demand in the agricultural sector, the Ministry of 
Energy is keen to encourage farmers to use solar panels. Another way to control electricity in 
the agricultural sector could be to raise the electricity price. Which of the two is the preferred 
option? If the system is not sensitive to the price of electricity (as it was not to water price), 
using solar panels seems to be a reasonable option and can at least reduce power 
consumption. As can be seen in figure.42, lower electricity prices can exacerbate the problem 
and accelerate groundwater extrac on. on the other hand, with a 15% increase in the price of 
electricity, the behavior of the system changes, and after an initial overshoot, the system 
reaches an equilibrium point ( me horizon has increased to 1000 years and no change has 
been observed). 







Figure 42: effect of electricity price on groundwater withdrawal 
 
 Rising electricity price has two major effects on the system. First, it reinforces the 
nega ve loop of B2 controlling the posi ve loop of R1. Besides, it will reduce the profitability 
(R/C ratio) which will encourage farmers to improve irrigation methods and increase irrigation 
efficiency, and the increase in irrigation efficiency has its effects which we will discuss it later 
(policy 13). With this explana on, it can be seen that encouraging farmers to use solar panels 
although reduce the electricity consumption (which is favorable for the Ministry of Energy), it 
will exacerbate the problem of groundwater deple on. Because it will weaken the B2 
balancing loop and increases water extraction. Another drawback is that the best time for 
irrigation is night‐time when there is no sunlight, the worst time for irrigation is noon when 
sunlight and evaporation is maximum (though adding a battery to the system which stores 
the electricity to use it in the night‐time, because of its high cost it is not welcomed by 
farmers) 
 
 Implementation Challenges 
 
1. Farmers’ resistance and strike: Previous increases in agricultural water price have resulted 
in farmers’ strikes. “Agricultural water use, which amounts to about 90% of the total 
consumed water, is very cheap and the government cannot easily raise the price due to 
political obstacles. Water and energy prices should be raised meaningfully to be reflective 
of the true cost of water and energy in each region across the country. This, of course, can 
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have serious negative impacts on the socioeconomic conditions of farmers in the short‐
run and is associated with a high political cost for the government. To prevent such 
impacts, the government should finance the modernization of agricultural practices that 
help farmers cut water and energy usage effectively. Although this strategy requires large 
initial investments, in the long‐term, it is expected to cost less than the current 
government policy, which heavily subsidizes the increasing water and energy use in the 
agricultural sector.” [46] 
2. Measurement and water extraction monitoring technologies: for solving this challenge the 
government has started to sell a specific water and electricity meter to farmers which can 
measure water and electricity consumption at the same time [77], and farmers can pay 
for it by monthly installments. 
3. Increase in electricity theft  
4. Populism: Populist actions of the Iranian decision‐makers, such as substantial subsidization 
of water and energy, to support farmers have failed to increase welfare in this sector. 
Given the existing political instability and insecurity within the system, decision‐makers are 
more interested in populist development actions which produce immediate economic 
impacts. For example, the representative of a region in the parliament can pressure the 
water authorities to finance a dam construction project to help the farmers in his region. If 
the project is successful, it can boost the regional economy alongside the legitimation of 
the representative. Locals would then be willing to support the same person and send him 
to the parliament in the next round. The long‐term environmental impacts are not 
associated with immediate economic benefits and political popularity. Thus, ecosystem 
preservation remains overlooked when pursuing populist development agendas. Similar 
development initiatives by other elected officials in the shared river basin will eventually 
create significant externalities, resulting in long‐term losses for all parties. A good example 
of this situation is the Lake Urmia tragedy, which is perhaps the most catastrophic water 
problem, experienced by the Iranians to date. The lake has almost dried up because of the 
anthropogenic effects of selfish and uncoordinated upstream development activities by 
three provinces in a competitive environment. Locals would then be willing to support the 
same person and send him to the parliament in the next round. The long‐term 
environmental impacts are not associated with immediate economic benefits and political 
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popularity. Thus, ecosystem preservation remains overlooked when pursuing populist 
development agendas. Similar development initiatives by other elected officials in the 
shared river basin will eventually create significant externalities, resulting in long‐term 
losses for all parties. A good example of this situation is the Lake Urmia tragedy, which is 
perhaps the most catastrophic water problem, experienced by the Iranians to date. The 
lake has almost dried up because of the anthropogenic effects of selfish and 
uncoordinated upstream development activities by three provinces in a competitive 
environment. [46] 
5. Increase in people’s dissatisfaction due to the increase in crops prices and inflation 
6. There is a direct correlation between water scarcity and level of poverty, and if the water is 
priced based on scarcity, poorer farmers living in the area of low water have to pay more 
for water [48] 
 
12.3.11. Policy (11): EC (electricity consump on) per liter water 
 
 As shown in figure.43, the function determining the relationship between energy 
consumption and water depth is an important and influential function on the fate of 
groundwater. With the technology advancement in water pumps and improving the efficiency 
of pumps, less electricity will be consumed to pump needed water, so the balancing loop of 
B2 will be weakened, shi ing dominant loop will be postponed, and groundwater resources 









Figure 43: effect of pumps technology and efficiency on groundwater withdrawal 




 Conversely, low‐efficiency pumps will be a barrier to groundwater extraction, and as 
can be seen, by reducing the pump's efficiency, after an overshoot, the system will balance 
with a damped oscillation. Therefore, banning high‐efficiency pumps, although seemingly 
increasing the electricity consumption in the agricultural sector, will control groundwater 
extraction. 
 Two points worth mention here. One, to ensure that this behavior is sustained, the 
 me period was increased to 1000 years and no change was observed. Second, in this model, 
the rela onship between electricity price and pump efficiency is ignored. In policy 10, we 
reached to the conclusion that electricity price can control water consumption. But, at the 
same time, farmers will shift to use the more efficient pump, consuming less electricity, and 
will neutralize the effect of electricity price on water extraction (what was explained in policy 
10). So, to have be er output from the model, we can add this effect to the model. 





Figure 44: effect of operating cost on groundwater withdrawal 
 As can be seen in figure.44, the system is not at all sensitive to operating costs. It can 
be concluded that if the government is interested in subsidizing farmers, it could be a subsidy 
for water and operating costs, and should not be for electricity at all. 
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12.3.13. Policy (13): Irriga on Efficiency 
 
 To support this sector, the government has heavily subsidized agricultural water and 
energy use. The significantly cheap prices have not provided any motivation for increasing the 
produc on efficiency in this sector. The average irriga on efficiency is about 40 % (while it is 
45% in advance countries and 65% in advanced countries). Only 5 % of the farmed area is 
under pressured irrigation and 95% is surface irriga on. During the last 30 years, irriga on 
efficiency has improved by only 1% (0.001) yearly [55]. 
 One solution that almost all experts agree on is to improve irrigation efficiency. But 
whether government‐subsidized improvements in irrigation efficiency really led to a decrease 
in water scarcity? Our model shows that this policy is completely useless (figure.45) 
 
 
Figure 45: effect of irrigation efficiency (IE) on groundwater withdrawal  
 
 At first, normal IE (irriga on efficiency) growth was changed to ± 15%, but it was 
observed that the system had no sensitivity to this variable. Even when the initial value 
mul plied by 10, it can be seen that the policy does not prevent the groundwater depletion, 
and collapse occurs anyway. But what is the reason? Why cannot an increase in irrigation 
efficiency handle over‐extraction? As can be seen in the figure.46, the main reason is that as 
irrigation efficiency increases, the size of irrigated land (and the share of HWD crops) is also 
increasing. 
 










Figure 46: effect of irrigation efficiency on irrigated land 
 
 Referring to the model, we can see it is true that there is a negative link between 
“irrigation efficiency” and “desired water” and it is expected that by increase in “irrigation 
efficiency”, “desired water”, “desired number of wells”, “number of wells”, and “withdrawal” 
decrease consequently. But, at the same time, there is a positive link between “irrigation 
efficiency” and “Max Possible Irrigated Land Based on Water Availability”, which can increase 
the size of “irrigated land” (and the share of HWD crops). Because the first link is 
“accumulating cause and effect” and the second link is “instantaneous cause and effect”, it 
causes the second link makes a short circuit, and in practice instead of reducing “desired 
water” (what policymakers intent), the size of the irrigated land (and HWD crop share) 
expand, and water consumption is not reduced at all. This effect is called “rebound effect” or 
“Jevons Paradox”6. In economics, the Jevons paradox occurs when technological progress or 
government policy increases the efficiency with which a resource is used (reducing the 
amount necessary for any one use), but the rate of consumption of that resource rises due to 
increasing demand [56]. The Jevons paradox is perhaps the most widely known paradox in 
environmental economics [57]. However, governments and environmentalists generally 
assume that efficiency gains will lower resource consumption, ignoring the possibility of the 
paradox arising [58]. 
 So until when irrigated land (and the share of high‐water demand crops) are 
unconstrained, modernization of irrigation methods is fruitless and cannot manage over‐
                                                             
6 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jevons_paradox#cite_note‐York‐2 
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extraction. How can we avoid the rebound effect? Julio Berbel et al. (2015) proposes three 
methods, namely, (1) the strict limita ons placed on the size of the irrigated area, (2) the 
reduc on of former water rights, and (3) the re‐assignation of water savings to achieve 
environmental goals [59]. 
 
12.3.14. Policy (14): Combined Policies 
 As we witnessed in the evaluation of the single‐parameters policies, the output of 
many of them differed with our expecta on. For example regarding policy 5 (Crop Water 
Requirements per ha), policy 7 (increasing the share of surface water for agriculture sector), 
policy 8 (Treated Waste Water for Agriculture), and policy 13 (Irriga on efficiency), we saw 
they are fruitless, due to an increase in irrigation land size (and HWD crop share). So one of 
the combined policies could be to limit the irrigated land size (and HWD crop share) and 
implemen ng one of these four policies. In the following, we will combine policy 1 (limi ng 
agriculture size) and policy 13 (improving irriga on efficiency). We increased the normal 
irriga on efficiency from 1% t0 3.5% and shrank permi ed irrigated land from 20 million 


















Normal IE growth= 1% & Total permited irrigated land=20 M ha1
Normal IE growth= 3.5% & Total permited irrigated land=5 M ha2
 
Figure 47: effect of shrinking irrigated land size and improving irrigated efficiency at the same time on groundwater 
withdrawal 
 In another scenario, in the year 150, when groundwater resources are declining 
rapidly, if the government starts a comprehensive plan to increase the irrigation efficiency to 
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the maximum possible (65%)7, we will see in figure.48 that the first few years the situation 
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Figure 48: result of comprehensive plan to maximize irriga on efficiency in the year 150 
 But if at the same  me in the year 150, the project of restric ng the irrigated land is 
implemented8, and not allowing more land to be irrigated (and more HWD crops cultivated), 
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Figure 49: maximization of irrigated efficiency and keeping irrigated land constant 
 
                                                             
7 change in IE= ((MIN(Max_IE-Irrigation_Efficiency, IE_growth*Irrigation_Efficiency))/AT)+(STEP(-
Irriga on_Efficiency+Max_IE,150)) 
8 desired IL based on all limitations = (Max_Possible_Irrigated_Land_based_on_Water_Availability)+(STEP(‐
Max_Possible_Irrigated_Land_based_on_Water_Availability+policy_interven on_Max_allowed_irrigated_land, 150)) 
policy intervention (Max allowed irrigated land) = Irrigated Land 
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Other combined policies can also be tested in the same way. 
 An important point should be mentioned here is the relationship between “irrigation 
efficiency” and “electricity consumption” is ignored in this model. Indeed, modernizing 
irrigation equipment, in turn, will lead to an increase in electricity consumption. This is 
another factor that can reduce farmers' incentives to improve irrigation efficiency, especially 
when the initial cost of buying new equipment and electricity price is high. Fernández García 
et al. (2014) shows “increasing of water use efficiency has been a key strategy for dealing with 
water scarcity in semiarid countries. In Spain modernization of irrigation schemes has 
consisted in the substitution of old open channels systems by pressurized networks. However, 
this improvement has represented a significant increase in water costs, mainly due to the 
higher energy requirements.”[75] 
 Implementation Challenges 
 The challenges of shrinking agriculture size were discussed earlier (in policy 1). But 
increasing irrigation efficiency also has its challenges, including: 
1. Cost: improving the technology of 6 million hectares irrigated land needs a huge amount 
of money while at the present the government suffers from financial problems and budget 
deficit 
2. Small size and a large number of farmer: A er Iran’s revolu on (40 years ago) the new 
government split farmlands and divided them among peasants. Now, the average of 
farmlands in Iran is under 5 hectare, while in successful countries it is above 80 hectares. 
For this reason, not only the number of stakeholders (farmers) are too much, but only due 
to the small size of farmlands, the penetration impact of technology is low. So, for a better 
result, the government should aggregate them again in the form of cooperative companies 
[48]. 
  
12.3.15. Policy (15): Water Governance (changing the current structure) 
 
 The main reason for the "tragedy of the commons” is that the ownership of water is in 
the hands of the government. When farmers own the water, they will try to conserve it and 
think about the long‐term benefit, not just the short‐term benefit. In this particular case, 
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when the groundwater level drops below a specific level, farmers feel threatened, increase 
irrigation efficiency, and maintain or even reduce the size of irrigated land (and the share of 
HWD crops). They will give groundwater resources an opportunity to recover themselves. In 
similar situations, when farmers are not privately owned water, they do not reduce the size of 
irrigated land (and the share of HWD crop), because they think that this will reduce their 
profits, but give competitors the opportunity to extract more water and make more profit. 
Especially farmers, who recently have started their activities, will try to extract as much water 
as they can before water depletion because they want to gain their initial investment at least 
and not going bankrupt. In other words, by decreasing groundwater, not only farmers do not 
reduce their water consumption, but they will try to gain maximum benefit in the remaining 
time before their competitors do that. It is almost similar to “prison dilemma” in game theory.  
Each player cares only about his/her profit and wants to achieve the highest possible profit. 
Although it is better for all farmers to reduce water consumption, the situation of (low 
withdrawal, low withdrawal) is not a Nash equilibrium, and both players have an incentive to 
deviate from this strategy.  
 If we have “water bank” (like California), and farmers have the ownership of water not 
only they will consume it more efficiently but also they can decide to sell their water to 
sectors with higher productivity (industry sector for instance); as an example, for producing 
1000kg wheat, 1,000,000 kg water is consumed while for producing 1000 kg steel, just 14,000 
kg water is consumed while. Also, the government should make involved other stakeholders 
in decision makings and the “top‐down” approach not only is not effective but also it has to 
allocate a lot financial and human resources to dictates its regulations. Whilst participatory 
decision making can minimize the resistance of the stakeholders. A reliable water market will 
increase the economic efficiency of water use. The implementation of a water market 
requires serious regulation and monitoring of water uses as well as creating a financial 
mechanism to support water trades. To overcome the current crisis, the government should 
also pursue setting up environmental water and try to purchase water from farms with low 
economic efficiency to recharge aquifers and recover damaged ecosystems. [46] 
 To investigate whether the change in water governance can prevent groundwater 
over‐extraction, we change the model structure and add a link from “the water level” 
(normalized water level) variable to “desired number of wells”. So when the groundwater level 
Tragedy of the Commons in Groundwater Resources 
70 
 
drops below a certain level, farmers will no longer dig a new well9. But how much should this 






Figure 50: effect of changing water governance on groundwater withdrawal 
 In figure.50, it can be seen when the “water level” reaches 90% or even 91% of the 
initial level, keeping constant “number of wells” and not digging new wells will not prevent 
groundwater depletion; and for this purpose, digging new wells must be stopped before the 
groundwater level reaches below 92% of the ini al level. The reason for this observa on goes 
back to the MSY concept. As long as the outflow is larger or equal to the inflow, there is no 
risk and the number of wells, irrigated land size, and the share of HWD crops can be 
increased. But when, even a trivial amount, outflow exceeds the inflow (ne low <0), 
inventory will decline and will sooner or later come to an end. 
 In fact, it can be concluded that not only the tragedy of the commons but also 
misperception about the amount of groundwater availability, the amount of remaining water, 
, and the amount of groundwater withdrawal and recharge can also lead to overshoot and 
collapse behavior. And it is highly probable since these amounts are unclear and hard to 
measure. This result is also consistent with research conducted by Moxnes (1998) [27]. So, 
                                                             
9 Desired number of wells = 
IF (Normalized_Level_of_Water>"min_acceptable_normalized_level_of_water_(STOP_digging_new_wells)") 
THEN ((desired_water-Available_Surface_Water)/withdrawal_per_well) ELSE (Number_of_Wells) 
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even in the case of private ownership of water, should be informed about the effect of these 
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PART IV: Conclusion & Discussion 
 
 The fourth and final part of this thesis includes a brief summary of this research and its 
outcomes. Also, some suggestions will be offered at the end for further studies.  
13. Summary: 
 The problem of water scarcity is a crucial issue that is one of the most important humanitarian 
challenges not only nationally (Iran) but globally. Water resources are going fast, and the picture is 
alarming in many places around the world. From India to Iran to Botswana, 17 countries 
around the world are currently under extremely high water stress. In those countries are 
several big, thirsty cities that have faced acute shortages recently, including São Paulo, Brazil; 
Chennai, India; and Cape Town, which in 2018 narrowly beat what it called Day Zero — the 
day when all its dams would be dry. Mexico’s capital, Mexico City, is drawing groundwater so 
fast that the city is literally sinking. In many countries, farmers are draining aquifers to grow 
water‐intensive crops like cotton and rice. Many US states, including New Mexico, also face a 
similar problem. By 2030, the number of cities in the extremely high stress category is 
expected to rise to 45 and include nearly 470 million people, with repercussions for public 
health, food insecurity, poverty, and social unrest. [80] 
 The big question is how we can address the problem? Although the broad policies 
have been implemented over the past several decades, the problem continued to persist or 
even become worse. Why are not those policies effective and do end in failure to address the 
problem? Whether the policies were not properly designed or it was a problem of their 
implementation? To answer these questions, we deployed the system dynamics approach. 
Building a qualitative SD model helps us to visualize our mental models, makes us 
contemplate our mental model and accurately articulate our opinions. This process can 
uncover and challenge our implicit assumptions. At the next step, when we quantify, test and 
analyze the model, some other bugs in our mental model are discovered and removed. 
 In this study, also the concept of “tragedy of the commons” is used to explain the 
problem of over‐extraction of groundwater resources in the agriculture sector, which is 
responsible for more than 90 percent of water withdrawal. The issue of excessive exploitation 
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and the depletion of a common‐pool resource arises when numerous individuals or 
communities use at the same time and in a collective way the same resource without 
excluding anyone of its use and trying to obtain the most advantage of its exploitation, 
causing the depletion of the shared resource. The tool of system dynamics is used to uncover 
and understand endogenous sources of the system behavior. Our SD model consists of four 
sectors (namely, irrigated land, profit, water, and irrigation efficiency), three reinforcing 
loops, and five balancing loops. Then 15 policies are evaluated to find the best policy. 
Thirteen of these policies just focus on one parameter, which by weakening the reinforcing 
loop and strengthening the balancing loops try to stabilize the system behavior and prevent 
groundwater depletion. One evaluated policy is a combined policy, and the last one is the 
policy which suggests changing the water governance and system structure. 
 To put it in a nutshell, the key finding is that if the government wants to control the 
size of irrigated land, share of HWD crops (policy 1), and number of wells (policy 6), it should 
consider the concept of maximum sustainable yield (MSY), and if these numbers slightly 
exceed MSY, system sooner or later will collapse. Also, if the government wants to manage 
the problem by manipula ng the prices, it has four op ons; price of crops (policy 3), water 
price (policy 9), electricity price (policy 10), and opera ng cost (policy 12). Among these four 
policies, increasing the price of crops will worsen the situation. In addition, the system is not 
sensitive to water price and operating cost. Therefore, increasing these prices just increases 
the dissatisfaction of farmers. On the other hand, system is very sensitive to electricity price, 
and the government should decrease the subsidy allocated to electricity price in agriculture. 
Besides, using solar panels in agriculture although it can decrease electricity consumption, it 
will exacerbate the problem of over‐extraction. In sum, we suggest to the government that if 
it wants to give subsidy to agriculture, it can be a subsidy for water and operating costs (since 
make farmers satisfied but have no effect of water consumption). Also, it should not at all 
give subsidy to electricity or try to encourage farmers to use the solar panels. Endeavors for 
handling the problem by controlling the parameters of Crop Water Requirements per ha 
(policy 5), the share of surface water for agriculture sector (policy 7), Treated Waste Water for 
Agriculture (policy 8), and policy Irriga on efficiency (13), are fruitless because of par al 
thinking and ignoring the “rebound effect”. For example, policy‐makers think increasing 
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irrigation efficiency will decrease water withdrawal since there is a linear relationship like 
below (Fig.51) between them. 
 
Figure 51: linear thinking about the effect of improving irrigation efficiency 
 But, we showed that there is another instantaneous link in the model that creates a 
short circuit causing above depicted intentions does not happen. An increase in irrigation 
efficiency will cause an incresae in “max possible irrigated land based on water availability” 
(Fig.52), and increasing every variable of a positive loop will lead to increasing of all other 
variables in the loop, and amplification of the reinforcing loop. 
 
Figure 52: how improving irrigation efficiency worsens the water over-pump 
So, we recommend the government for implementing combined policies that is, it should first 
control the size of irrigated land and the share of HWD crops, then apply one of these four 
policies. To examine, we combine two policies of shrinking irrigated land size (policy 1) and 
increasing the irriga on efficiency (13) and show how much this combined policy can be 
effective. In the end, we evaluate the policy of changing the water governance and show that 
not only the tragedy of the commons but also misperception about the amount of 
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groundwater availability, the amount of remaining water, and the amount of groundwater 
withdrawal and recharge can also lead to overshoot and collapse behavior. 
 To sum up, if we want to highlit how system dynamics was useful in adding value to 
the tragedy of the commons issue in groundwater extraction in Iran, we can mention the 
following: 
1) Holistic view: 
 The lack of a holistic view and ignoring feedback loops, delay, accumulation, and 
nonlinearity will end into piecemeal solutions, which may alleviate the problem for a short 
time but in the longer horizons can lead to unintended consequences, create new problems, 
or exacerbate the previous problems.  
 We saw how linear thinking and ignoring the rebound effect can make many policy 
interventions useless. Also, we saw how dynamic relationship between positive and negative 
loops can lead to some unexpected and counterintuitive results which human’s mind, due to 
its intrinsic limitations, is not able to reach without the help of SD and computer models. For 
instance, although it seems that subsidy for water will make water less costly, make it seem 
less scarce, and will decrease water use efficiency, one way or the other, we saw that it is 
better for the government to do not eliminate the water subsidy, since it can cause many 
political and social pressure for the government, but it has a trivial effect on diminishing water 
scarcity. 
2) Shared understanding: 
 The model can create a shared understanding among different stakeholders (farmers, 
ministry of energy, ministry of agriculture, …) with diverse interest. Consensus  and 
mutual understanding can mitigate stakeholders’ resistance and promote their commitment, 
which is a prerequisite for alleviating water scarcity. 
In the end, as the last word, I would like add two points: 
1. SD models are transparent boxes; this advantage causes other researchers to be able to 
easily adjust the model and use for other countries, by changing numbers and 
assumptions. 
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2. Another advantage of SD models is applying operational thinking, which makes the model 
easily expandable. As follows, some suggestions are offered to expand and improve the 
model.  
14.Suggestion For Future Studies 
 
1. Working on the lookup functions outlined in Appendix (C) to improve the results of the 
model. In fact, I didn't find acurate functions for them until I wrote this thesis (I am still 
working on them), and I had no way than to make some educated guesses. For example, 
we assumed that there is nonlinear relationship between “level of water” and “electricity 
consumption”. in the World Bank report (2010) [78], although this rela onship is assumed 
linear, the author mentions that “it is not always reasonable to assume full smoothness of 
the pumping cost function, as I do. As pumping depths increase, one may need, at some 
point, to switch from simple (surface) pumps to much more expensive submerged pumps, 
this increasing the overall pumping cost drastically at one (or more) discrete point(s). This 
complication is ignored here.” 
I also refered to the catalog of submersible pumps for PUMPIRAN company [79] to check 
the relationship between H (head of pump) and P (pump power) when the flow (Q) is 
constant.  I extracted the below figure: 
Q = 10 (m3/hr) 





149 7.9   
  
Figure 53: relationship between “pump head” and “pump power” 
Although this figure demands more work, at least it shows that our assumption about 
nonlinear relationship between “pump suction head” and “pump power” is not irrational.  
 
2. Adding those highlighted suggestions offered in Part III: 
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 effects of supply and demand on crop price 
 impact of production costs on crop price 
 the relationship between electricity price and pump 
 The relationship between “irrigation efficiency” and “electricity consumption.”  
3. adding the mechanism of “land price” which can affect “crop price” 
4. we assume that the “water price” is constant but in practice the fewer water resources, 
the more water prices, which in turn, will affect the “price of crops” 
5. For “irrigation efficiency”, we ignored the depreciation and lifetime of irrigation facilities. 
6. To simplify the model we merged the share of HWD crops with the size of the irrigated 
land. They can be separated, and instead of two stocks of “arable land” and “irrigated 
land”, we can three stocks of “arable land”, “land for LWD crops”, and “land for HWD 
crops”. 
In this case, maybe other factors that influence farmers' decision should be considered. 
For example, their perception about prices, since if all farmers cultivated HWD crops, their 
price will drop and the price of LWD will go up. In addition, LWD and HWD crops should 
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The World 3 model was developed by Forrester in 1973. This model examines the 
changes in mineral, organic, and human resources based on human activities on 
Earth. 
2 
Meadows et al. 
(1974, 1992) 
‐‐‐ 
The World3 model was completed by Meadows and her colleagues in the 1974 and 






They developed a model called “Field Phosphorus.” This model simulates the use of 
phosphorous materials in a region's agriculture and its impact on the quality of 
groundwater and surface water. This model examines the impact of agricultural 
optimization programs on reducing phosphorus in water resources 
4 




Investigating the shape of Cape Cod in Massachusetts, USA. With regard to climate 
change in the world, this model deals with the progress of seawater in the cape. 
Coastal erosion is a dynamic issue, and the dynamics‐based model makes a 
significant contribution to simulating the changes in the process for the next years. 
This study is, in fact, the integration of geographic information systems (GIS) with 
the dynamics of the system. 
5 Ford (1996) USA 
This model is built through a participatory model building process and addresses the 
issue of over‐allocation of river flows to various types of stakeholders from farmers 
to energy generation. 
6 
Rotmans, I., 
and Devries, B. 
(1997) 
Netherlands  
The “Target” model was developed by the Dutch National Environmental and Public 
Health Ins tute in 1997. The model consists of several parts: popula on, health, 
energy, land, food, water and circulation of biological elements. The water sector 
has humanitarian functions, including water supply for urban use, industry, 
agriculture, electricity, and coastal protection. Environmental functions include 
water supply for the land ecosystem and the maintenance of the water ecosystem 
quality, and also includes the impact of social, economic, and environmental 








For sustainable management of solid wastes, they have built a model based on SD. 
This model is tailored to Indian cities, in which the dynamics of the health, economy, 
environment, and human behavior cycles are set. This model can simulate the 
results and effects of management plans. 
8 
Vezjak et al. 
(1998) 
Slovenia 
This model deals with the effects of the aggregation of phosphorus and nutrients 
from agricultural runoff and sewage drainage 
9 
Bala & et al. 
(1998) 
--- 
Using the SD method, they presented a model that predicted the volume of water 
needed for the farm, the irrigation time, and its effect on the yield of the product. 
10 Forester (1999) --- 
In the book “Urban Dynamics,” in 1999, Forester explores the social and economic 





Water resources policy analysis deals with the protection of people from the 
harmful effects of water and assurance of a consistent, adequate supply of usable 
water. Population and regulatory pressures, political and economic instabilities, and 
climatic variations can all be expected to further stress water supply resources. 
Developing policy for managing water systems for human needs in such an 
environment is difficult, slow, and very costly. The approach to water resources 
policy analysis developed in this paper is that of the rational decision‐maker who 






The model has been developed for the management of the resource in the 
catchment area. Characteristics of this model are modeling complex environments, 





Canada Using SD, the behavior of a reservoir (dam) is simulated for rainy years and flood  
14 Huerta, J.M., Mexico Manage a basin in Mexico. The prepared model has been a powerful tool for solving 






disputes between the five provinces and national water departments on the 
distribution of surface water. 
15 
Guo et al. 
(2001) 
China 
This model has been developed to examine the changes in the quality of lake water 
in China. The negative effects of rapid socio‐economic development on the quality 
of the lake cause concerns among regional executives. In this model, a 
comprehensive system of environmental, economic, and social components of the 
lake has been developed, and the effects of four management plans have been 
reviewed. The advantage of this model is the reflection of the results of simulating 
water quality decisions for managers. 
16 Xu et al. (2002) China 
Seeking for sustainable management of water resources in response to ever‐
increasing demand, taking into account different scenarios (such as climate, etc.), 
and giving readers an overview of the factors affecting both sides of supply and 
demand and the road map for water management. 
17 Saysel (2002) Turkey 
Using the SD method, they simulated the crop pattern, crop rate, and agricultural 
pollution in southern Turkey. Their results showed that the current policies adopted 





The model of Canada's Water considers the entire Canadian region and a part of the 
United States in an area of 10 million square kilometers. To achieve this regional 
model, the “World” model has been used. The Canadian model takes into account 
nine sub‐systems; population, capital, agriculture, food, water, water quality, 
energy, persistent pollution, and non‐renewable resources, in an interconnected 
way. The purpose of this model is to simulate Canadian water quality and quality 
relationships with major socio‐economic variables over a period of more than 100 
years. Twelve scenarios have been simulated for various policies: available water 
changes, sewage treatment, economic growth, energy production, and food 
production. The results of this model indicate a shortage of gas for energy 
production and a sharp drop in water quality in the coming years. 
19 
Tangirala et al. 
(2003) 
USA The Effect of Nutrients on Water Quality 
20 Stave (2003) USA 
Using participatory model building, Las Vegas's water scarcity has been modeled in 
the state of Nevada. In this model, different ways of managing demand are 
reviewed from the viewpoint of the people, and their results and impacts on 
reducing the gap between supply and demand are examined. The advantage if this 











Investigating socio‐economic plans for managing water availability at the country 
level 
23 
Stewart et al. 
(2004) 
Mexico 
Planning and managing water resources in a catchment area using hydrological 
simulation 
24 
Tidwell et al. 
(2004), 
USA 
Using participatory modeling to introduce key hydrological, social, and 






The dynamic model of environmental sustainability for agriculture and land‐use 
change was presented in Spain. The research results showed that reducing irrigated 
lands in order to balance the supply and demand of water not only eliminates the 
problem of water scarcity but also improves the environmental problems caused by 
irrigation of agricultural lands. 
26 
Habron, G. B., 
Kaplowitz, M. 
D., and Levine, 
R. L. (2004) 
--- 
In this research, based on the results of previous researches, a conceptual 
framework that can provide a link between social sectors and environmental 










Planning and managing water resources in a catchment area using hydrological 
simulation 
29 
Chen, C. H., Liu, 
W. L., Liaw, S. 
China 
Chen and his colleagues presented the study entitled "Development of Theory and 
Dynamic Planning System for Sustainable Management at River Basin Levels." In this 
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L., (2005) work, the goal was to determine how to create integrated management of 
groundwater resources and climate in the basin area  
30 Winz (2005) 
New 
Zealand 
 Applying SD, they developed a framework for a water supply system for managing 
and sustainable development water resources in New Zealand. 
31 
Ho, C. C., 
(2005) 
Taiwan 
The effects of water management decisions for South Taiwan have been used. The 
proposed model examines the effect of an increase in the capacity of water 





This model is provided to optimal water allocation in the San Wan Basin, between 
Colorado and Mexico, and various stakeholders. The model quantifies the economic 
interactions of various water uses. Also, this model estimates the impact of climate 
change on the main river. 
33 




The model is about a basin located between three states. This model is designed for 
integrated management of groundwater and surface water of this basin by 
integrating hydrological information with other information (social, economic, and 
political). 
34 
Leal Neto et al. 
(2006) 







The process of influencing hot springs 
36 
Langsdale et al. 
(2007) 
Canada 
Group model building and including climate change in the planning and 
management of water resources 
37 
Croke et al. 
2007 
Australia 
This model offers an integrated assessment of water resources management in 
Australia and suggestions solutions in order to achieve more sustainability at the 
basin level. 
38 
de Fraiture, C. 
(2007) 
--- 
The “WaterSim” model analyzes water and food security in the regional and global 
levels.  
39 
Yang et al. 
(2008) 
Taiwan 
Using SD, they study the challenges of water scarcity in Taiwan. In this research, a 
combined process of system dynamics approach and analysis of impacts are 
presented for systematic and quantitative evaluation of water sector strategies. 





S. P. (2009) 
--- 
They provided an operational model for supporting interconnected river basin 
management. In this research, a simulation based on the dynamics of the systems 
approach is presented. In this approach, the concepts of feedback are used to 
express social, economic, and environmental processes in the basin. 
41 
Li & et al. 
(2009) 
--- 
They used the concept of SD for the rice fields. The model evaluated different 
components of water balance, such as actual evapotranspiration, deep penetration, 
surface runoff, and climbing of valleys on a daily scale of simulation and scenarios 
for dealing with water resource constraints. 
42 




The model is an integrated assessment tool for water resources under the 
development of urbanization in arid areas. This research explains the benefits of 
using an integrated assessment approach as an effective tool for analyzing the 








In this research, using SD and attention water use in agricultural, industrial, urban 






This study deals with dynamic simulation in South Florida. This model outlines the 
interconnections between access to water and competition for increasing water 






Exploring the scourge of increasing water scarcity in the world by simulating 
different subsystems, including climate, food production, resources and water 
consumption, and water quality 
46 
Venkatesan et 
al. (2011a, b) 
USA Salinity of water 
47 
Qaiser et al. 
(2011) 
USA 
Seeking sustainable management of water resources in response to increasing 
demand, taking into account different scenarios (such as climate, etc.), and giving 
readers an overview of the factors affecting both sides of supply and demand and 
the road map for water management. 




Shrestha et al. 
(2011, 2012) 
USA carbon footprint and energy consumption of different water supply methods 
49 
Mirchi A. et al., 
(2012) [60] 
--- In this paper, they tried to explain the problems associated with water resource 
management in the language and archetype of SD 
50 
Langarudi et al. 
(2019) [17] 
‐‐‐ 
This paper responds to this theoretical gap by developing a SD model that takes into 
account key feedback loops in a socialhydrology system to enable us to look at 
longer term trends (e.g. over ten years), as well as shorter term trends. The 






Studies focused on cased of Iran 
 
Table 5: studies in the field of water management using the dynamics of systems focusing on the case of Iran 
 Authors Cased Studied Explanations 
1 
Ali N. Mashayekhi, 
(1990)[44] 
Iran 
The model consists of ten endogenous sectors and two exogenous sectors. 
Exogenous sectors include "population" and "underground resources", and 
endogenous sectors include (1) water supply equipment (2) water 
distribu on channels and sewage collec on (3) water supply facili es to 
ci es (4) Water distribu on equipment in the city (5) Surface water (6) 
Government (7) Water resources management (8) Industrial and urban 
sector (9) Agricultural sector (10) Borrowing services. Among the ten 
mentioned exogenous sectors, the first four sectors, which represent water 
resources equipment, include five stages of planning, feasibility, 
engineering design, construction, and operation. In this model, using gap 
analysis, he examines the effectiveness of various strategies on the 





City of Yazd 
The model includes five sectors; (1) industry (2) agriculture (3) urban 
development (4) water (5) popula on. It deals with water scarcity in the 
city of Yazd, and evaluates the impact of five following solu ons: (1) 
Control of popula on growth and growth of industrial development (2) 
transfer of water from other areas to Yazd (3) restrict the size of agriculture 
sector (4) improve irriga on methods (5) avoidance of water transmission 
3 
Sadeghi et al. 
(2005)[62] 
Sistan 
Modeling the exploitation of Sistan water reservoirs in order to control the 
flood 
4 
Jalali & Afshar 
(2005)[63] 
--- To exploit hydropower dams, an SD model is applied to evaluate 
management scenarios 
5 Golian et al. (2006)[64] 
Urmiah Lake 
Basin and the 
Aji Chai River 
Basin 
The study analyzes the utilization of water resources in the Aji‐Chai basin 
and introduces the most appropriate policy that satisfies the interests of all 
uses and development goals. 
6 
Salvitabar A. et al., 
(2006)[65] 
Tehran 
it addresses the urban water management problem in Tehran, simulates 
the behavior of groundwater variables by 2020, and inves gate the 
changes in the future water bill and the impact of management scenarios 
such as inter‐basin transfer of water, implementation of sewage collection 
and treatment scheme and demand management. 
7 




Zayandeh‐Rud catchment area is modeled, and its fate is investigated in 
different scenarios, including: 
(1) Con nued current trends (2) climate change, (3) demographic changes 
(4) economic recession (& 5) changes in surface water. In this study, 
different social, economic, political, and physical interactions of the basin 
were considered. Using causality circles and a simulation method, they 
concluded that the transfer of water from the basin was not the only 
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solution to the problem. 
8 
Zarghami M, Akbariyeh 
S, (2012)[67] 
city of Tabriz 
The model addresses the urban water problems of Tabriz. it includes 
potential sources of water supply (groundwater, imported fresh water, and 
refined wastewater), and potential water users (households, industry, and 
agriculture) and management tools (sewage treatment, water transfer 
between water basins, price Water, protective devices)  
9 
Seyed Ahmad Hosseini 
and Ali Bagheri 
(2013)[68] 
Mashhad 
This paper seeks to analyze the sustainable development strategies of 
Mashhad plain water resources, and to develop policy packages with triple 
strategies (economic growth with a water resource constraint approach, 
allocation of water resources with value‐added approach, and changing the 
pattern of cultivation) and their impact on selected indicators including: 
aquifer level, source stress, resource economic efficiency, water shortage, 
and average water requirement of the plain are investigated. 
10 




effectiveness of water supply projects for Zayandeh‐Rud Basin 
11 Alami et al. (2014)[70] Golak Dam 
In this paper, the effects of Golak reservoir dam in collecting flood flows 
during rainy days, supplying the needs of the area and feeding the aquifer 
in the lower plain aquifer were investigated.  
12 
Fartookzadeh et al. 
(2014)[71] 
Tehran 
Results derived by the model of water management in Tehran show that 
population and technology control policies can be combined with policies 
such as taxation and tariffs to work more efficiently. 
13 
Qashqai & et al. 
(2014)[72] 
Tehran Study of the average changes in groundwater level in Tehran plain 
14 
M. Zarghami, M.A. 
Rahmani (2015)[73] 
Urmia lake 
Investigating the effectiveness of methods to revive Urmia lake, including 
increasing irrigation efficiency, minimizing agricultural sector, fertilizing 
clouds, and transferring water 
15 




The model is about the Zayandeh‐Rud River basin, Iran, and comprises 
hydrological, socioeconomic, and agricultural sub‐systems. Agricultural 
land‐use decisions are assumed to be based on income‐maximization. Ten 
crop types are included in the agricultural sub‐system, namely wheat, 
barley, potato, rice, onion, alfalfa, corn, garden products and vegetables, 
and cereal and legume. Land area for each crop is defined as a function of 
the corresponding net economic benefit in the previous year. The expected 
agricultural water demand is the sum of expected water demand for all 
crops. Because of water scarcity in the basin, “delivery rate” is defined as 
the proportion of agricultural water demand that can be fully satisfied 
using available water supply. The land area for each crop is estimated by 
adjusting the expected land area for that crop based on the water delivery 
rate. 
16 





the model consists of 2 reinforcing loops and 6 balancing loops. feedback 
loops (R1, R2) represent the interaction between groundwater level and 
groundwater lost. The first two nega ve feedback loops (B1, B2) represent 
the interaction between groundwater volume and total GW discharge. the 
third balancing loop (B3) considers the interac ons between immigration 
and per capita water consump on. the fourth balancing loop (B4) 
represents the interaction between employment in agriculture and labor 
cost. B5 shows having less groundwater level, pumping cost will escalate 
which causes higher cost of goods sold. And the last balancing loop (B6) 
implies the interaction of water per capita and net immigration. The results 
show that the policy of combination of budget allocation for conservation 
education and modification in water tariffs might be more effective in 
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Figure 54: Running Model 
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Appendix (C): Documentation of simulation model 
 In this section, we present the selected non‐trivial formulations that play an important 
role in the model, which the reader may be interested in knowing. Also in table.6, all the 
equations are listed. 
1. Water Table Capacity: 
 Instead of “level of water” variable, variable of “normalized level of water” is used, 
which is equal to ‘Normalized Level of Water = Groundwater Resources / initial GR’ and is 
unitless. This variable affects the “water table capacity” non‐linearly as shown in Fig.51. 
 
  
Figure 55: Water Table Capacity 
 When ‘Groundwater Resources / ini al GR = 1’, “effect of water level on WTC” is also 
one (that is, makes no change). But as the water level decreases, the land subsides, and the 
table is destroyed over time. At first, the groundwater reservoirs are resilient and resist 
destruction. But over time, they lose their resistance and begins to destruct. For this reason, 
the graph slope is not too steep at first, but gradually it becomes steeper, and reservoirs are 
destroyed more rapidly. In the end, again the slop decreases, and with the complete 
depletion of the source, the groundwater reservoir is almost completely destroyed, and the 
capacity will become zero. Of course, we have assumed that this destruction occurs 
continuously, while it might depend on Soil characteristics and other factors, and for example, 
may fall in the form of a step function. “water table capacity” is calculated by the below 
formula; 
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Water Table Capacity  = 
(-Water_Table_Capacity+MIN(Water_Table_Capacity, 
initial_GR*eff_of_water_level_on_WTC))/AT 
 According to this formula, in each run, the value of “water table capacity” stock is 
replaced by the minimum between its current value and “initial_GR * 
eff_of_Water_Level_on_WTC.” Please note that according to this formula, this change is 
irreversible. Although this change can be reversible over hundreds of years, it is far beyond 
our model time period. 
 
2. Return Fraction: 
  
Figure 56: Return Fraction 
It is assumed that, under normal conditions, one‐third of the water used to irrigation will pass back to 
groundwater by passing through the soil pores (normal return frac on = 1/3). However, this number is 
not constant, but a non‐linear function of the water level (Normalized Level of Water): 
return fraction = normal fraction * eff of Water Level on return fraction 
 As shown in Fig.52. When ‘normalized level of water = 1’, “eff of water level on return fraction” 
is also one, that is, the return fraction equals “normal return fraction.” With the decrease in 
groundwater levels, the land will subside, and soil will become more compact, and the return fraction 
decreases. Again, in the first, the land shows more resilience, and the slope is gentle, but gradually, it 
loses its initial resistance.  
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3. Electricity Consumption and Electricity Cost: 
“Electricity Cost” is calculated by this formula; 
Electricity Cost = Total Electricity Consumption (EC) * Electricity Price 
That;  





Figure 57: Electricity Consumption 
 
 Yet, “Electricity Consumption per liter water” is not a fixed number, and the lower the 
water level, the stronger pumps should be used, and the more electricity will be consumed 
per liter water; 
Electricity Consumption (EC) per liter water = 
Normal Electricity Consumption per Liter * eff of Water Level on Water consumption 
 As shown in Figure.53, “Electricity Consumption (EC) per liter water” is a nonlinear 
function of “1-Normalized Water Level”. When “1-Normalized Level of Water” = 0, that is, the 
reservoir is full, “eff of water level on EC” is one, and electricity consumed per liter water is 
equal to “normal EC per liter,” and this amount increases exponentially as the water level 
drops. 
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4. Irrigation Efficiency: 
 Irrigation Efficiency is changing with the variable rate of “change in IE (Irrigation 
Efficiency),” and there is a maximum value for it (since in developed countries it is 0.65, we 
take it 0.65 in the model); 





Figure 58: Irrigation Efficiency 
 The amount of “IE growth” is not constant and depends on “Revenue-Cost (R/C) Ratio. 
The cheaper the water and electricity, and the bigger “R/C Ratio,” the fewer incentive farmers 
have to invest in improving irrigation technology, but when R/C goes down, the farmer will try 
to improve IE and decrease lost water to make more money from expensive water. 
Irrigation Growth = Normal_IE_growth*"eff_of_R/C_Ratio_on_IE_growth" 
 
5. desired irrigated land: 
desired Irrigated Land 
=Irrigated_Land*(desired_growth_based_on_profitability_&_external_limitations) 
 When R/C is bigger than one, farmers interest to expand their business (“max possible 
growth based on external limitations” is considered 2%), but when it is losing they start to 
decrease the size of their business.  





























Figure 59: desired irrigated land 
 
6. Operating Cost: 
Operating Cost = (operating_cost_per_ha)*SQRT(Irrigated_Land) 
Please note two points regarding this formula: 
(1) The reason that we use SQRT function for calculating operating costs, is that we 
wanted to consider “economies of scale” effect. 
(2) applying this formula, we will face an error in unit consistency. To solve this problem, 
we used the variable of “unit regulator” which equals one and its units is “hectares”. Then 
we replaced above formula by the below one: 
Operating Cost = (operating_cost_per_ha)*SQRT(Irrigated_Land*Unit_Regulator) 
 
 





Table 6: Equations 
Equations 
Top‐Level Model: 
Arable_Land(t) = Arable_Land(t ‐ dt) + ( ‐ change_in_IL) * dt {NON‐NEGATIVE} 
INIT Arable_Land = (20*1000*1000‐Irrigated_Land) 
UNITS: Hectares 
OUTFLOWS: 
change_in_IL = gap_1/AT 
UNITS: Hectares/years 
Groundwater_Resources(t) = Groundwater_Resources(t ‐ dt) + (recharge ‐ withdrawal) * dt {NON‐
NEGATIVE} 
INIT Groundwater_Resources = (initial_GR‐withdrawal*AT) 
UNITS: Liters 
INFLOWS: 




withdrawal = (Number_of_Wells*withdrawal_per_well)/AT {UNIFLOW} 
UNITS: Liters/years 
Irrigated_Land(t) = Irrigated_Land(t ‐ dt) + (change_in_IL) * dt {NON‐NEGATIVE} 
INIT Irrigated_Land = 1.2*1000*1000 
UNITS: Hectares 
INFLOWS: 
change_in_IL = gap_1/AT 
UNITS: Hectares/years 
Irrigation_Efficiency(t) = Irrigation_Efficiency(t ‐ dt) + (change_in_IE) * dt {NON‐NEGATIVE} 
INIT Irriga on_Efficiency = 0.3 
UNITS: unitless 
INFLOWS: 
change_in_IE = ((MIN(Max_IE‐Irrigation_Efficiency, IE_growth*Irrigation_Efficiency))/AT) 
UNITS: Per Year 
Number_of_Wells(t) = Number_of_Wells(t ‐ dt) + (change_in_wells) * dt {NON‐NEGATIVE} 
INIT Number_of_Wells = 6.58*1000 
UNITS: numbers 
INFLOWS: 
change_in_wells = gap_2/AT 
UNITS: numbers/years 
Water_Table_Capacity(t) = Water_Table_Capacity(t ‐ dt) + (change_in_WTC) * dt {NON‐NEGATIVE} 
INIT Water_Table_Capacity = initial_GR 
UNITS: Liters 
INFLOWS: 
change_in_WTC = ((‐Water_Table_Capacity+MIN(Water_Table_Capacity, 
initial_GR*eff_of_water_level_on_WTC))/AT) 
UNITS: Liters/years 
AT = 1 
UNITS: Years 
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Available_Surface_Water = 20*1000*1000*1000 
UNITS: Liters 
Available_Water = withdrawal*AT+Available_Surface_Water 
UNITS: Liters 
Crop_Water_Requirements_per_ha = 5000 
UNITS: Liters/hectares 
desired_growth_based_on_profitability_&_external_limitations = GRAPH("R/C_Ratio") 
(0.000, 0.00682670794277), (0.100, 0.0183459341613), (0.200, 0.0483743906411), (0.300, 
0.121586980463), (0.400, 0.274320249797), (0.500, 0.510), (0.600, 0.745679750203), (0.700, 
0.898413019537), (0.800, 0.971625609359), (0.900, 1.00165406584), (1.000, 1.01317329206) 
UNITS: unitless 





desired_number_of_wells = IF (Groundwater_Resources>0) THEN ((desired_water‐
Available_Surface_Water)/withdrawal_per_well) ELSE (0) 
UNITS: numbers 
desired_water = (desired_Irrigated_Land*Crop_Water_Requirements_per_ha)/Irrigation_Efficiency 
UNITS: Liters 
EC_per_liter_water = Normal_EC_per_Liter*eff_of_water_level_on_EC 
UNITS: kilowatts/liters 
"eff_of_R/C_Ratio_on_IE_growth" = GRAPH("R/C_Ratio") 
(0.000, 3.97992144723), (0.200, 3.85772238047), (0.400, 3.19317573589), (0.600, 1.80682426411), 
(0.800, 1.14227761953), (1.000, 1.02007855277) 
UNITS: unitless 
eff_of_water_level_on_EC = GRAPH((1‐Normalized_Level_of_Water)) 
(0.000, 1.00), (0.100, 2.74345830469), (0.200, 5.11104383467), (0.300, 8.32618309361), (0.400, 
12.6922853204), (0.500, 18.6213748928), (0.600, 26.6729736262), (0.700, 37.6069022456), (0.800, 
52.4549838517), (0.900, 72.618415959), (1.000, 100.00) 
UNITS: unitless 
eff_of_water_level_on_return_fraction = GRAPH((Normalized_Level_of_Water)) 
(0.000, 0.000), (0.125, 0.406375195854), (0.250, 0.650401704303), (0.375, 0.79693854374), (0.500, 
0.884933267954), (0.625, 0.937773710804), (0.750, 0.969504163118), (0.875, 0.988558159446), 
(1.000, 1.000) 
UNITS: unitless 
eff_of_water_level_on_WTC = GRAPH(Normalized_Level_of_Water) 
(0.000, 0.00449627316094), (0.100, 0.0131253183371), (0.200, 0.0376878905086), (0.300, 
0.103400451458), (0.400, 0.253506016662), (0.500, 0.500), (0.600, 0.746493983338), (0.700, 
0.896599548542), (0.800, 0.962312109491), (0.900, 0.986874681663), (1.000, 0.995503726839) 
UNITS: unitless 
Electricity_Cost = Total_EC*Electricity_Price 
UNITS: dollars 
Electricity_Price = 0.002 
UNITS: dollars/kilowatts 
gap_1 = desired_IL_based_on_all_limita ons‐Irrigated_Land 
UNITS: Hectares 
gap_2 = desired_number_of_wells‐Number_of_Wells 
UNITS: numbers 
IE_growth = Normal_IE_growth*"eff_of_R/C_Ratio_on_IE_growth" 




ini al_GR = 300*1000*1000*1000 
UNITS: Liters 
Life me = 20 
UNITS: Years 
max_growth_based_on_external_limitations = 1.01 
UNITS: unitless 





min_acceptable_withdrawal_per_well = 0.001 
UNITS: unitless 
netflow = recharge‐withdrawal 
UNITS: Liters/years 
Normal_EC_per_Liter = 6 
UNITS: kilowatts/liters 
Normal_IE_growth = 0.001 
UNITS: unitless 
normal_return_frac on = 0.3 
UNITS: unitless 
Normalized_Level_of_Water = Groundwater_Resources/initial_GR 
UNITS: unitless 
Operating_Cost = (operating_cost_per_ha)*SQRT(Irrigated_Land*Unit_Regulator) 
UNITS: dollars 
opera ng_cost_per_ha = 300 
UNITS: dollars/hectares 
price_of_crop = 0.5 
UNITS: dollars/ kilograms 
"R/C_Ratio" = Revenue/Total_Cost 
UNITS: unitless 
Rainwater_Penetra on = 33*1000*1000*1000 
UNITS: Liters 
return_fraction = normal_return_fraction*eff_of_water_level_on_return_fraction 
UNITS: unitless 
Revenue = Total_Yield*price_of_crop 
UNITS: dollars 
Total_Consumed_Water = Irrigated_Land*Crop_Water_Requirements_per_ha/Irrigation_Efficiency 
UNITS: Liters 
Total_Cost = total_E&W_costs+Operating_Cost 
UNITS: dollars 
total_E&W_costs = Electricity_Cost+Water_Cost 
UNITS: dollars 
Total_EC = (withdrawal*AT)*EC_per_liter_water 
UNITS: kilowatts 
Total_Yield = Irrigated_Land*yield_per_ha 
UNITS: Kilograms 
Unit_Regulator = 1 
UNITS: Hectares 
Water_Cost = Available_Water*Water_Price 




Water_Price = 0.0025 
UNITS: dollars/liters 
withdrawal_per_well = 40*1000 
UNITS: Liters/numbers 
yield_per_ha = 2700 
UNITS: Kilograms/ hectares 
{ The model has 59 (59) variables (array expansion in parens). 
In root model and 0 addi onal modules with 4 sectors. 
Stocks: 6 (6) Flows: 6 (6) Converters: 47 (47) 
Constants: 19 (19) Equa ons: 34 (34) Graphicals: 5 (5) 
} 
 
 
 
